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The plaintiff/appellantf Gary Hunt, pursuant to Rule 
24(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, submits the 
following Brief. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j)(1988) . This case 
was poured over to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(4). This is an appeal from a final Order and 
Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Tooele 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding. 
The Order and Judgment entered by the trial court granted the 
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, 
for Partial Summary Judgment, and dismissed the plaintiff's 
Second Amended Complaint against the defendant ESI Engineering, 
Inc. ("ESI") with prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issue is presented to this Court for 
review, 
1. Did the trial court err in concluding that no 
material issues of fact existed and that ESI was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiff's negligent design 
claim because ESI did not design the transfer conveyor which 
injured Gary Hunt? 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
There are no determinative constitutional or 
statutory provisions which control this appeal, The issues are 
determined by case law authority. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, 
This is a negligence action brought by the plaintiff 
against the defendants Domtar Industries, Inc.; Lakepoint Salt 
Company, Inc.; and ESI Engineering, Inc., alleging that the 
defendants were negligent in the design, construction and/or 
maintenance of the transfer conveyor on which the plaintiff was 
hurt. The plaintiff has settled his claims against Domtar 
Industries, Inc. and Lakepoint Salt Company, Inc. ESI is the 
only defendant remaining in the action. 
B• Course of Proceedings. 
The plaintiff's claims of negligsmce against ESI, at 
the trial level, were as follows: 
(1) The transfer conveyor was designed and construc-
ted without a guard at the tail pulley; 
(2) The transfer conveyor was designed and construc-
ted without a pull-rope electrical kill switch 
along the length of the conveyor; 
2 
(3) The transfer conveyor w<*s designed and construc-
ted without a self-cleaning tail pulley, a plow 
scrapper, training idlers, or a vulcanized 
spliced belt. 
ESI moved for Summary Judgment or, in the Alter-
native, for Partial Summary Judgment on the following four 
issues* 
(1) Summary judgment on all the plaintiff's claims 
of negligence on the grounds that the transfer 
conveyor which injured the plaintiff was not the 
transfer conveyor ESi designed and which 
Lakepoint constructed in 1982 and 1983; 
(2) Partial summary judgment on plaintiff's second 
claim of negligence regarding an electrical kill 
switch on the grounds that ESI was not retained 
to design and did not design the electrical 
controls of the transfer conveyor; 
(3) Partial summary judgment on plaintiff's third 
claim with regard to
 a self-cleaning tail 
pulley, a plow scrapper, training idlers, and a 
vulcanized splice belt on the grounds that: a 
failure to design the transfer conveyor 
initially without a self-cleaning tail pulley, a 
3 
plow scrapper, training idlersf and a vulcanized 
splice belt did not fall below the standard of 
care ordinarily exercised by professional 
engineers; it would only fall below the standard 
of care of an engineer not to use all of some of 
these devices to correct excessive tracking of 
the conveyor, once that problem exhibited 
itself; ESI last performed work on the salt wash 
plant in June 1983 and was not advised of track-
ing problems with the transfer conveyor; and the 
transfer conveyor did not track excessively 
until the summer of 1985. 
(4) Partial summary judgment on plaintiff's first 
claim of negligence with regard to the absence 
of a tail pulley guard on the grounds that a 
guard complying with the standard of care would 
still have resulted in some injury to plaintiff, 
and the jury should not be permitted to 
speculate on the injuries which would have been 
prevented by a guard. 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of 
ESI on issue (1); granted partial summary judgments on issues 
(2) and (3); and denied partial summary judgment on issue (4). 
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The plaintiff appeals only the Court's ruling on 
issue (1), where the Court concluded that ESI is not liable to 
the plaintiff because the transfer conveyor which injured the 
plaintiff was not the transfer conveyor ESI designed in 1982. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. On August 30, 1985, Gary Hunt was injured at the 
Salt-Air Salt & Chemical Co.f Salt Wash Plant. (R. 765). 
2. Gary Hunt was injured when his left hand and 
left arm were pulled into the tail pulley of the transfer 
conveyor he was working on. (R. 7 66). 
3. In May 1982, Engineering Associates, Inc. now 
known as ESI, was retained to provide engineering design of the 
salt washing facilities of the salt wash plant, including the 
design of transfer conveyors. (R. 767). 
4. ESI prepared two drawings that depicted the 
transfer conveyor on which Gary Hunt was injured. (R. 767). 
5. ESI's drawings of the transfer conveyor did not 
include a tail pulley guard. (R. 767). 
6. Lakepoint used the ESI drawings to fabricate the 
transfer conveyor. (R. 269, 270.) 
7. Gary Hunt's experts, William Donald Peterson II 
and Vincent A. Gallagher, Jr., testified that the failure to 
design the transfer conveyor with tail pulley guards did not 
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conform to standard design practice and was negligent. 
Peterson testified as follows: 
Q. Have you formulated any opinions or 
conclusion whether any of the parties in 
this case were negligent using that 
definition? 
A. The conveyor was not complete in that 
it didn't have a return-pulley guard. 
(Peterson deposition, p. 38, lines 2-6.) 
Q. What in your opinion should have been 
in the design that wasn't in the 
design? 
A. The standard design practice requires 
the pinch points of the head pulley 
and the tail pulley to be guarded 
from. It also requires design of the 
drive system being guarded. In this 
case. . .the tail pulley was not 
guarded. 
(Peterson deposition, p. 39, lines 6-11, 12, 15.) 
Q, By stating "standard design practice, 
are you referencing the practice in 
your profession, are you referencing 
OSHA standards, what are you 
referencing? 
A. Practice in the profession . . . the 
practice in the profession has got to 
have some knowledge of OSHA 
standards. OSHA is a minimum, but 
usually it's more than — you do more 
than what OSHA would require. 
Q< At Pemco when . you were designing 
conveyor systems, did you guard the 
pinch points of the head and the tail 
pulleys? 
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A. Yes. 
(Peterson deposition, p. 40, line 23-25, p. 41, lines 1, 3-10.) 
Gallagher testified as follows: 
Q. Would you tell me what opinions or 
conclusions you have rendered with 
regard to his case. 
A. It's my opinion that the conveyor 
system where Mr. Hunt was injured was 
unreasonably dangerous for a number of 
reasons. 
Q. Would you tell me those reasons. 
A. The ingoing nip point at the tail 
pulley was completely exposed. It 
should have been guarded. And there's 
abundant references in the safety 
literature that give direction to 
engineers on how to avoid that 
hazardous area. 
(Gallagher deposition, p. 72, lines 2-12). 
Q. Anything else? 
A. I think it was a very unsafe design, 
it was an invitation to injury. 
(Gallagher deposition, p. 73, lines 3-5). 
8. Frank Bonell, ESI's current president, testified 
about ESI's involvement with the design of the subject transfer 
conveyor as follows: 
Q. Did you do the general layout of the 
salt wash plant? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Was it built in the same manner or 
same layout that you had designed? 
A. The basic structures were, yes. This 
would have been in cooperation with 
Mr. Palmer. 
Q. Okay. Just so I'm clear, the layout 
of the conveyor system and the augers 
and the grizzly and the bins was all 
basically as you had design€>d in your 
preliminary and/or final designs. 
A. That's right. 
(Bonell Deposition, p, 33, lines 20-25; p. 34, lines 1-5). 
Q. Was there anyone else at ESI who was 
involved in the salt wash plant 
design? 
A. No. 
Q. Was there anyone who helped you do the 
drawings? 
A. No. 
Q. So you did all the drawings yourself? 
A. Yes. 
(Bonell Deposition, p. 34, lines 21-25; p. 35, lines 1-2). 
9. Bonell also testified about his previous 
experience with designing conveyors and the need for pulley 
guards: 
Q. Now, did you design the conveyor 
systems for these other five projects? 
Did I ask you that before? 
A, Yes. 
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Q. And these other conveyor systems on 
these other salt projects - did they 
involve pulleys and - belt driver 
pulleys, I guess? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were they designed with guards on the 
pulleys, these other five projects? 
A. Some were. Some were - some of them 
are not exposed to - some of them are 
not. You're not able to put a guard 
around the pulley because of the sheer 
location of the positioning of the 
conveyor. 
Q. Did the ones outside the United States 
have guards or pull cords? 
A. I don't recall. I know they had - in 
places where there was exposure, they 
had guards. 
• * * 
Q. Take a moment and just briefly 
describe for me the situation then 
where you would put a - or have put a 
guard on the pulley and - and the 
situation in which you have not. In 
other words, tell me when you do and 
when you don't in your practice. 
A. If the pulley is in the position where 
it can come in direct contact with an 
individual, where he is working on or 
around it, it should be - have a guard 
on it. 
(Bonell Deposition, p. 43, lines 23-25; p. 44, lines 
21; p. 58, lines 8-15) . 
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10. Peterson and Gallagher testified that a tail 
pulley guard would prevent someone's entire arm from being 
pulled through the nip point of the tail pulley. 
Peterson testified as follows: 
Q. That's not the type of occurrence that 
a guard is intended to prevent — Is 
it? — getting caught by the belt 
itself? 
A.. No. 
I think if this guy's going to get 
caught, that — The guard is there to 
keep the guy from getting to the nip 
point. And any way he's pulled into 
it, the most logical way he's going 
to get pulled into it is somehow 
getting hooked on the belt. 
Q. If he gets hooked on the belt and he 
is pulled up onto the belt itself, he 
could go into the nip point. You've 
already described that that is 
possible. 
A. If he could get around it. But as 
soon as he gets to the edge of the 
guard, his body would stop. In this 
case, it may have pulled his thumb 
off, but I don't think he would have 
gotten into the nip point. 
Q. Why couldn't it just have pull€?d his 
whole arm off? 
A. I think the — the peeling of the skin 
off the thumb would come before it 
would pull the arm out of the socket. 
(R. 266, 267, Peterson deposition, pages 63, lines 13-25; page 
64, lines 1-8; page 64, lines 21-25; page 65, line 1.) 
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Gallagher similarly testified: 
Q. If his whole hand was caught by the 
belt splice wire, would it be possible 
that his whole hand or his arm would 
have been pulled off if we had the 
guard as you've shown? 
A. I think it would have just pulled 
flesh off rather than pulled members 
off. 
Q. . . .How would the guard have 
prevented the accident if his hand 
became engaged in the belt and moved 
towards the nip point and then got 
caught in the nip point? 
A. Well, it would have prevented him from 
having his arm extend far enough to be 
able to get into the ingoing nip 
point, it would not have prevented 
injury to his hand. 
(R. 267, 268; Gallagher deposition, page 90, lines 11-17.) 
11. ESI's drawings of the transfer conveyor depict 
an open web steel joist frame. (R. 769). 
12. The Salt Wash Plant was operated with the open 
web steel joist frame transfer conveyor during the 1983, 1984 
and part of the 1985 season. (R. 769). 
13. ESI last performed engineering services on the 
Salt Wash Plant on June 29, 1983. (R. 774). 
14. Some time during the 1985 season, the frame of 
the transfer conveyor was changed from the open web steel joist 
frame to a channel iron frame. (R. 770). 
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15. James Palmer, the general manager of Sol-Aire 
Salt Company, in his April 8, 1988 deposition, explained how 
the transfer conveyor was built in relation to ESI's design: 
Q. Now I ask you to identify what has 
been marked Deposition Exhibit 1. 
Just tell me what it is, 
A. It's a print showing the wire mesh 
belt and the transverse conveyor. If 
you'd like to call it transfer 
conveyor that would be fine. 
Q. Now was this the blueprint that was 
used to fabricate the belt, the 
transfer belt conveyor? Did I get 
that right? 
A. With the stipulation, that I made 
before that we will use standard parts 
here but we might change this 
configuration to our convenience but 
generally the length was okay and, 
yeah - -
Q. What kind of frame does the blueprint 
call for? 
A. It shows a web frame. 
Q. And what kind of frame was actually 
built? 
A. Looked like we went to a channel iron 
frame which is a little better rubber 
construction. 
Q. Were there any other substantial or 
significant differences between the 
transfer belt conveyor as drawn on 
this exhibit and the way it was 
actually built? 
A. No, looks like - pretty good. 
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• * * 
Q. Who drafted the blueprint that's 
Deposition Exhibit 1, do you know? 
A, I do not know who drew it, 
Q. Who did you get it from? 
A. I got it from ESI Engineering, Mr. 
Bonell. 
(Palmer Deposition, p. 27, lines 16-21; p. 28, lines 2-8, 17-
25; p. 29, lines 5-9). 
16. Peterson testified that the open web steel 
joist frame did not act as a guard to the lower belt as it 
returns to the tail pulley to any greater degree than the 
channel iron frame. 
Q. Does the open-web steel joist, then, 
sort of act like a guard of the lower 
belt as it returns to the tail pulley? 
A. To some degree. 
Q. To a greater degree than the channel 
iron frame shown in Exhibit 4-B-4, 
doesn't it? 
A. No, I wouldn't say to any greater 
degree. 
(Peterson deposition, page 61, lines 3-9.) 
17. The day after Gary Hunt's accident, Lakepoint 
maintenance crews fabricated a guard on the tail pulley of the 
transfer conveyor. (R. 774). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in 
concluding, as a matter of law, that ESI did not design the 
transfer conveyor on which Gary Hunt was injured. 
In 1982, ESI designed the transfer conveyor which 
ultimately injured Gary Hunt. The design drawings of that 
transfer conveyor did not include a tail pulley guard. The 
plaintiff's expert has testified that designing the transfer 
conveyor without including a tail pulley guard falls below the 
standard of care in the industry and is negligent. In 1985, 
the frame of the transfer conveyor was changed by Gary Hunt's 
employer. The transfer conveyor still did not have a tail 
pulley guard. 
When designing a product, a duty exists to exercise 
reasonable care in that design to insure that the product is 
reasonably safe to use. O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 
1278 (Wyo. 1985). In cases in which it has been alleged that a 
product is negligently designed, the jury is required to 
determine whether the product lacked any safeguard necessary to 
make it safe for normal use. Gottfried v. American Can Co., 
489 A.2d 222 (Pa.Super. 1985). The plaintiff claims that ESI 
was negligent in its design of the transfer conveyor for 
failing to include a tail pulley guard. The plaintiff's theory 
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of the case is that the 1985 change in the frame of the 
transfer conveyor was not a "substantial" change from a 
liability standpoint because the design defect, the lack of a 
tail pulley guard, still existed. It was that design defect 
which had a causal connection to Gary Hunt's injury. While a 
change in any product may be viewed as material or significant 
from a design or operational standpoint, it is not deemed 
"substantial" for liability purposes unless the changes related 
to the safety of the product. McDermott v. Tendun Contractors, 
511 A.2d 690 (N.J.Super. 1986). What is a substantial change 
is to be gauged by all the circumstances surrounding the case 
and should be determined by a jury. Busch v. Service Plastics, 
Inc., 261 F.Supp. 136 (D.C. Ohio 1966). Even if the change was 
substantial, ESI is still liable if the original design 
defect, here the lack of a tail pulley guard, was either the 
sole or concurrent proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. 
Soler v. Castmaster Division of HPM Corp., 98 N.J. 137, 484 
A. 2d 1225 (1984). These are all jury questions. 
This case should be remanded to the trial court to 
allow the jury to determine whether or not a design defect 
existed in the transfer conveyor as originally designed by ESI, 
whether there was a substantial alternation in that design, and 
even if there was a substantial alternation in the design, 
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whether the original design defect was a proximate cause of 
Gary Hunt's injuries. 
ARGUMENT 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE QUESTIONS OF FACT 
EXIST AS TO WHETHER A DESIGN DEFECT EXISTED IN THE 
TRANSFER CONVEYOR AS DESIGNED BY ESI, WHETHER THERE 
WAS A SUBSTANTIAL ALTERATION IN THAT DESIGN, AND EVEN 
IF THERE WAS A SUBSTANTIAL ALTERATION, WHETHER THE 
ORIGINAL DESIGN DEFECT WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HUNT'S INJURY 
Judge Brian concluded that Gary Hunt was not injured 
by the transfer conveyor design by ESI in 1982. This con-
clusion was based on the change in the frame of the transfer 
conveyor which took place in 1985. At that time, the frame was 
changed from the open web steel joist frame? designed by ESI to 
a channel iron frame. The sole issue on appeal is whether or 
not that alteration in the original ESI dessign is sufficient, 
as a matter of law, to relieve ESI from liability. It isn't. 
a. Any alteration in the transfer conveyor was not " sub-
stantial" for liability purposes. What is "substantial" 
is a jury question. 
Hunt first argues that the 1985 change in the 
transfer conveyor frame was not the substantial type of change 
meant to affect a designer's liability. While the change in 
any product may be viewed as material or significant from a 
design or operational standpoint, it is not deemed "substan-
tial" for liability purposes unless the change is related to 
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the safety of the product. McDermott v. Tedun Constructors, 
211 N.J. Super. 196, 511 A.2d 690, 698 (1986). A substantial 
change is one that involves not only a material change in the 
design or function of the product, but also affects the risk of 
danger in its use. Hanlon v. Cyril Bath Co., 541 F.2d 343, 345 
(3d Cir. 1975). Whether an alteration is substantial for 
liability purposes is to be determined by a jury under all 
circumstances presented. Soler v. Castmaster Division of HPM 
Corp., 484 A.2d 1225, 1231 (N.J. 1984); Busch v. Service 
Plastics, Inc., 261 F.Supp. 136 (D.C. Ohio 1966). 
A subsequent alteration of a product will not provide 
a defense to the designer if that subsequent alteration is not 
substantial in terms of the essential features of the product. 
Whitehead v. St. Joe Lead Co. Inc., 729 F.2d 238, 250 (3d Cir. 
1984) . 
The change in the transfer conveyor frame in this 
case did not materially change the design or function of the 
transfer conveyor, did not affect the risk of danger in its 
use, and did not change its essential features. 
James Palmer of Sol-Aire has testified that, except 
for the change in the frame, the transfer conveyor was 
essentially the same as that designed by ESI. No alteration of 
the essential features of the transfer conveyor was mentioned. 
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In fact, Palmer simply stated that the channel iron frame is "a 
little better rubber construction•" Donald Peterson clarified 
that the frame change did not affect the safety aspect or risk 
of danger in the transfer conveyor. He said that the open-web 
steel joist frame didn't provide any greater degree of safety, 
as a guard for the lower belt, than the channel iron frame. 
This testimony creates questions of fact as to 
whether the alteration in the frame was of the "substantial" 
nature meant to affect a designer's liability for negligent 
design. Summary judgment was improper and the case should be 
remanded for the determination of that issue. 
b. Even if the alteration were "substantial," ESI may still 
be negligent for its original design of the transfer 
conveyor without tail pulley guards if that design was a 
proximate cause of Gary Hunt's injury. 
Even if the frame alteration is deemed "substantial" 
for liability purposes, ESI may still be found negligent for 
its original design defect of not including a tail pulley 
guard in its design of the transfer conveyor. 
In 1985, the transfer conveyor frame was changed from 
an open web steel joist frame to a channel iron frame. ESI is 
liable for any injuries proximately caused by the design defect 
of failing to install a tail pulley guard even if the transfer 
conveyor underwent substantial change after it left ESI's 
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control, if the original design defect constituted either solef 
or concurrent or contributing, proximate cause of the injury. 
Soler v. Cast Master Division of HPM Corp., 98 N.J. 137, 484 
A. 2d 1225 (1984). The facts and legal issues of the Soler case 
are very similar to this case and will be reviewed in detail. 
In Soler, the plaintiff brought an action against the 
manufacturer of a die-casting machine. The plaintiff was 
injured when certain moving parts of the machine closed on his 
hand. The plaintiff claimed that the machine, as designed and 
manufactured by the defendant, had no safety gate or any other 
device to guard against a person's hand or fingers coming into 
contact with the machine's moving parts while the machine was 
in motion or capable of being set in motion. After the machine 
left the manufacturer's control, the plaintiff's employer 
altered the manual mode for starting the cycles under which the 
machine operated. 
The first cycle began when the operator pressed a 
designated electrical push-button causing the machine to close 
so that hot metal could be injected into it. The second cycle 
started when the operator pressed another button, permitting 
the metal to cool and the completed cast to drop from the mold 
or removed by hand by the operator. The plaintiff's employer's 
alterations added a trip wire that automatically started all 
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cycles after the machine was initially turned on. As altered, 
the cycles operated continuously. The plaintiff's employer 
also added a safety gate not included in the manufacturer's 
original design. 
The plaintiff was injured when he attempted to 
dislodge a finished product that had not fallen free from the 
mold. After the plaintiff dislodged the* part, the machine 
started up and caught the plaintiff's hand between the two 
parts of the mold. The plaintiff's expert testified that the 
machine was unsafe as designed because it had no safety gate or 
other device to prevent a person's hand from contacting the 
machine's moving parts. Id. at 1228. 
The case was tried to a jury. After most of the 
plaintiff's evidence had been presented, the trial court, on 
the manufacturer's motion, entered a judgment of involuntary 
dismissal. In entering that judgment, the tarial court ruled 
that there was no dispute that the machine had been altered by 
the plaintiff's employer and that, as altered, the machine was 
"an entirely different functional machine," The trial court 
also found that there was no evidence from which a jury could 
find that the machine as designed and sold by the manufacturer 
had in it the elements which were the proximate cause of the 
plaintiff's injury. With that factual and procedural back-
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ground, the Soler case went to the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
on appeal. 
The similarities between the facts of Soler and this 
case are obvious- In 1982, ESI produced the drawings from 
which the transfer conveyor was constructed. Those design 
drawings did not include a tail pulley guard. Lakepoint used 
those drawings to fabricate the transfer conveyor. In 1985, 
Hunt's employer altered the transfer conveyor by changing its 
frame from an open web steel joist frame to a channel iron 
frame. There was still no tail pulley guard on the transfer 
conveyor. Gary Hunt was injured when he got caught on the 
transfer conveyor and was pulled around the nip point of the 
tail pulley. Hunt claims that ESI negligently designed the 
transfer conveyor by not providing a tail pulley guard. Hunt's 
experts have testified that the design was negligent for 
failing to include a tail pulley guard. Frank Bonell, of ESI, 
who designed the transfer conveyor for Lakepoint, testified 
that a guard should be included in the design if the pulley is 
exposed and can come in direct contact with the worker. 
Vincent Gallagher has testified that the nip point at the tail 
pulley on this conveyor was "completely exposed." All of this 
testimony creates issues of fact regarding the existence of a 
defect in the original design which must be decided by a jury. 
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Judge Brian granted nummary judgment for ESI 
concluding that Gary Hunt was not injured by the transfer 
conveyor design by ESI. For the same reasons outlined by the 
New Jersey Supreme Court in the Sfller case, summary judgment 
was improper. The case should be remanded to the trial court 
to allow a jury to determine the issues presented by the 
plaintiff. 
In remanding the Soler c#se to the trial court, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court stated: 
The evidence in this cage fairly posed a 
jury question as to whether the change made 
by plaintiff's employer to the die-casting 
machine was "substantial" in terms of 
increasing its risk of accidental injury. 
. . . The operational risk of danger in 
using the machine as originally d€>signed 
with manual buttons to start each cycle was 
qualitatively and materially different from 
the risks of danger in the automatic 
operation of the machine in its altered 
state. Consequently, tha evidence in the 
case was ample to permit a jury to conclude 
that the die-casting machine for strict 
liability purposes had been substantially 
altered after it left the control of the 
defendant. The critical question then is 
whether the original defect in the design 
of the machine, the absence of the safety 
gate with interlock, constitutes a 
proximate cause of the accident, notwith-
standing the subsequent substantial 
alteration. We said in Michalko, supra, 91 
N.J. at 400, 451 A.2d 179: 
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Even a significant subsequent 
alternation of a manufactured 
product will not relieve the 
manufacturer of liability unless 
the change itself creates the 
defect that constitutes the 
proximate cause of the inj-ury. 
States Steamship, 371 F.Supp. at 
505. Thus, if the defect which, 
singly or in combination, caused 
the injury existed before, as 
well as after, the change, the 
manufacturer is not relieved of 
liability, regardless of how much 
the product has been changed. 
Id. ; Ortis v. Farrell Co., 171 
N.J. Super. 109 [407 A.2d 1290] 
(Law Div. 1979) . 
Implicit in our decision was the premise 
that the original design defect in the die 
machine — the absence of a safety device-
- could constitute a proximate cause of the 
accident, regardless of whether the 
subsequent alteration consisting of a 
change in the starting mechanism of the 
machine was deemed substantial by the jury. 
Id. at 1231. 
In language that is particularly applicable to Gary 
Hunt's theory in this case, the Soler court continued: 
In this case, as we have said, the jury 
could on the evidence presented determine 
that the machine had been subjected to a 
substantial alteration after leaving the 
control of defendant. Still, the jury 
could reach the further conclusion that the 
original design, though substantially 
changed, did contribute to the occurrence 
of the accident, and that the proximate 
cause of the accident inhered solely or 
primarily in the original defective design 
of the machine. As we observed in 
Finneqan; 
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The jury could infer that because 
of the lack of the safety device 
the accident would have occurred 
notwithstanding the change to an 
electrical foot pedal. Thus, it 
could conclude that the substi-
tution had little or nothing to 
do with the happening of the 
accident. At the most, the 
alteration bears on the issue of 
proximate cause and was a matter 
for the jury. [60 N.J. at 423-24, 
290 A.2d 286]. 
Id. at 1232. 
Gary Hunt alleges negligent design for failure to 
have a tail pulley guard on the transfer conveyor. This 
original defect did not change after the 1985 alteration in the 
frame of the transfer conveyor. Hunt claims that regardless of 
the frame alteration, the original design defect still existed 
and was a proximate cause of his injury. Even substantial 
changes which do not affect a pre-existing design defect do 
not absolve the manufacturer of liability. Union Supply Co. v. 
Pust, 196 Colo. 162, 583 P.2d 276, 283 (1978). 
The lack of a tail pulley guard need not be the sole 
proximate cause of Gary Hunt's injury. Even if the alteration 
in the transfer conveyor is deemed substantial, the jury could 
determine that that change contributed to the happening of the 
accident in conjunction with the transfer conveyor's original 
design defect, the lack of a tail pulley guard. As stated in 
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SoLer, under those circumstances, the defendant could still be 
liable because the original design defect, although not the 
sole cause of the injury, would constitute a contributing or 
concurrent proximate cause in conjunction with the subsequent 
alteration. Soler v. Castmaster Division of H.P.M. Corp., 98 
NoJ. 137, 484 A.2d 1232 (1984). ESI seems to argue that there 
can only be one proximate cause to an injury. The Utah Supreme 
Court has held that there may be more than one proximate cause 
of an injury. Hall v. Blackman, 18 Utah 2d 164, 417 P.2d 664 
(Utah 1966). In fact, Judge Brian denied ESI's motion for 
partial summary judgment on issue (4), concluding that genuine 
issues of material facts exist as to whether a tail pulley 
guard would have prevented Hunt's injuries. 
The reasoning of the Soler court applies to this case 
even though that case dealt with strict products liability 
under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. The basis for 
Judge Brian's ruling was that the alteration made in the 
transfer conveyor absolved ESI of liability. In negligent 
design cases, a jury should determine whether the product 
lacked any safeguard necessary to make it safe for normal use. 
O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278 (Wyo. 1985); 
Gottfried v. American Can Co., 489 A.2d 222 (Pa. Super. 1985). 
The difference between a negligent design theory of liability 
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and strict products liability is that in strict products 
liability, the manufacturer may be liable despite its best 
efforts to design a safe product. Mathers v. Caterpillar 
Tractor Corp., 23 Ariz. Ct. App. 409, 533 P.2d 717 (1977). 
Under the reasoning of the Mathers case, the same 
legal considerations that go into determining whether there 
has been a substantial alteration to a product under § 402A are 
the same considerations that go into deciding whether there was 
a substantial change in ESI's design of the transfer conveyor. 
There is no reasonable distinction for arguing that cases 
dealing with substantial alteration under § 402A do not or 
should not apply to negligent design cases not based on strict 
liability in tort. The legal considerations and questions 
raised for the jury are the same. The difference is only in 
whether liability will be based on the designer's negligent 
conduct or the unreasonably dangerous nature of the product 
regardless of the designer's conduct. 
c. The issues presented on appeal are questions of fact for 
the jury, requiring remand. 
The questions of whether an original design defect 
existed in the transfer conveyor; whether there was a 
subsequent substantial alteration in that design, and whether 
the original design defect alone, or in conjunction with the 
subsequent alteration, was a proximate cause of Gary Hunt's 
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injury are all properly questions to be considered by a jury. 
Soler v. Castmaster Division of H.P.M. Corp., 98 N.J. 137, 484 
A.2d 1225, 1234 (1984). ("All of the questions that have been 
discussed in the course of this decision — original design 
defect, subsequent substantial alteration, and proximate 
causation — are properly to be considered jury questions."); 
Brown v. Clark Equipment Co., 62 Hawaii 530, 618 P.2d 267 
(1980). (Ordinarily it is a question for the jury whether the 
failure to install safety devices creates an unreasonable 
risk.); Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 184 Cal. Rptr. 891, 
649 P. 2d 224 (1982). (A claim that a product is defective in 
design because it lacked a particular safety device presents a 
factual issue for the trier of fact.); Richards v. Upjohn Co., 
95 N.M. 675, 625 P.2d 1192 (1980). (Proximate cause in a 
products liability case is a factual issue.); Apache Tank 
Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614 (Utah 1985). (Proximate 
cause is usually a fact issue and in most circumstances, will 
not be resolved as a matter of law.) 
Summary judgment should be granted with great caution 
in negligence cases. Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 
1985). On appeal, all reasonable inferences to be drawn from 
the evidence must be drawn in a light most favorable to Gary 
Hunt. Hall v. Warren, 662 P.2d 848 (Utah 1981). 
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CONCLUSION 
Summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim against ESI 
for negligent design of the transfer conveyor was improper. 
Questions of fact exist which should be determined by the 
jury. Those questions of fact include whether ESI's failure to 
include a tail pulley guard in its design was negligent; 
whether the 1985 frame alteration was substantial and, even if 
it wasf whether it combined with the original design defect to 
proximately cause Gary Hunt's injury. This case should be 
remanded to the trial court for a jury's determination of those 
issues. 
DATED this day of May, 1990. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GARY HUNT, 
VS. 
Plaintiff, 
DOMTAR INDUSTRIES, INC., 
a corporation, LAKE POINT 
SALT CO., a corporation, 
ESI ENGINEERING, INC., a 
corporation, and JOHN 
DOES I through X, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION 
AND FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 87061 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION 
This litigation arises out of serious injuries 
suffered by Plaintiff, Gary Hunt, on or about August 30, 1985, 
when his left hand and arm were pulled into the tail pulley of 
the transfer conveyor at the Sol-Aire Salt and Chemical 
Company, Salt Wash Plant. The Salt Wash Plant was constructed 
in 1982 and 1983. The Salt Wash Plant was owned at that time 
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by defendant Lake Point Salt Company. Lake Point Salt Company 
engaged ESI Engineering, Inc. to design the Salt Wash Plant. 
Plaintiff has dismissed his claims of strict liability 
in tort and is proceeding to trial solely on negligence claims 
against defendants Lake Point Salt Company ("Lake Point"), 
Domtar Industries, Inc. (a related corporation to Lake Point) 
and ESI Engineering, Inc. ("ESI*). Plaintiff's claims of 
negligence against ESI are as follows: 
(1) The transfer conveyor was designed and 
constructed without a guard at the tail pulley; 
(2) The transfer conveyor was designed and 
constructed without a pull-rope electrical kill switch 
along the length of the conveyor; 
(3) The transfer conveyor was designed and 
constructed without a self-cleaning tail pulley, 
a plow scraper, training idlers or a vulcanized 
spliced belt. 
ESI filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the 
Alternative, for Partial Summary Judgment seeking judgment on 
four issues as follows: 
(1) Summary Judgment as to all of Plaintiffs 
claims of negligence on the grounds that the transfer 
conveyor which injured Plaintiff was not the transfer 
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conveyor ESI designed and which Lake Point constructed 
in 1982 and 1983; 
(2) Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's 
second claim of negligence regarding an electrical 
kill switch on the grounds that ESI was not retained 
to design and did not design the electrical controls 
of the transfer conveyor; 
(3) Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs 
third claim with regard to a self-cleaning tail 
pulley, a plow scraper, training idlers and a 
vulcanized splice belt on the grounds that: a failure 
to design the transfer conveyor initially without a 
self-cleaning tail pulley, a plow scraper, training 
idlers and a vulcanized spliced belt did not fall 
below the standard of care ordinarily exercised by 
professional engineers; it would only fall below the 
standard of care for an engineer not to use all or 
some of these devices to correct excessive tracking of 
the conveyor, once that problem exhibited itself; ESI 
last performed work on the Salt Wash Plant in June, 
1983 and was not advised of tracking problems with the 
transfer conveyor; and the transfer conveyor did not 
track excessively until the summer of 1985. 
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(4) Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs 
first claim of negligence with regard to the absence 
of a tail pulley guard on the grounds that a guard 
complying with the standard of care would still have 
resulted in some injury to Plaintiff/ and that the 
jury should not be permitted to speculate on the 
injuries which would have been prevented by a guard, 
ESI's Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the 
Alternative, for Partial Summary Judgment came on for hearing 
before the Court on April 26, 1989/ at approximately 11:30 
a.m. Plaintiff was represented by its counsel/ Daniel F. 
Bertch/ Esq./ ESI was represented by its counsel/ Craig R. 
Mariger# Esq. and Sue Vogel, Esq./ and Domtar Industries, Inc. 
and Lake Point were represented by their counsel, Stuart L. 
Poelman, Esq. The Court heard argument from Daniel F. Bertch, 
Esq. and Craig R. Mariger, Esq. At the conclusion of argument, 
the Court granted ESI's Motions for Partial Summary Judgment on 
issues (2) and (3) stated above. The Court took under 
advisement issues (1) and (4) of ESI's Motion. On April 27, 
1989, the Court granted ESI's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
issue (1) and denied ESI's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
on issue (4). 
Ik"4" 
In accordance with Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Court, having reviewed the memoranda and 
affidavits submitted by counsel, having heard the arguments of 
counsel, having considered the deposition testimony of 
Plaintiff, James Palmer, Verl Young, Michael Bolinder, J. Frank 
Bonell, Dean Cox Matthews, Ernest LaVar Gunderson, 
Donald Anderson, Gary Padley, William D. Peterson, Vincent 
Gallagher and Michael Cutler referred to in the memoranda of 
counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, hereby makes 
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about August 30, 1985, Plaintiff Gary Hunt 
was injured at the Sol-Aire Salt and Chemical Company Salt Wash 
Plant while he was employed by Sol-Aire Salt and Chemical 
Company as the Salt Wash Plant Operator. 
2. At the time of the accident, salt was mined from 
settling ponds and taken to the Salt Wash Plant for cleansing. 
The Salt Wash Plant was comprised of ramps supported by 
retaining walls which permitted large trucks to drive over a 
grizzly (screen) upon which the salt was dumped by the trucks. 
The salt fell through the grizzly into one of two wet salt 
bins. The salt flowed from the wet salt bins by gravity into 
one of two immersion washers. The salt was then carried by 
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screw conveyors from each immersion washer onto one of two wire 
mesh conveyors. The wire mesh conveyors partially dewatered 
the salt as it moved the salt east and discharged the salt onto 
the transfer conveyor, which was perpendicular to the two wire 
mesh conveyors. The transfer conveyor was a nylon-corded 
rubber belt conveyor which carried the partially dewatered salt 
to the long belt, which was perpendicular to the transfer 
conveyor. The long belt carried the salt east to the stacking 
conveyor, a movable incline conveyor which deposited the salt 
in storage piles. A diagram of the Salt Wash Plant was 
attached as Exhibit "1" to the Affidavit of Frank B. Bonell 
("Bonell Affidavit") and was identified as Exhibit Hlw during 
argument of the Motion. 
3. Gary Hunt was injured when his left hand and left 
arm were pulled into the tail pulley of the transfer conveyor. 
The upper belt of the transfer conveyor moved salt from north 
to south. When the salt reached the far southern end of the 
transfer conveyor, it was deposited onto the long belt as the 
transfer conveyor belt moved around the head pulley. The head 
pulley is the drive pulley to which a motor is attached. The 
lower portion of the transfer conveyor belt moved from south to 
north where it wrapped around the tail pulley of the transfer 
conveyor in a counter-clockwise rotation. 
n Cr6-
4. The Salt Wash Plant was designed and constructed 
in 1982 and 1983. It was first operated during the summer of 
1983. At that time, the salt plant was owned by Lake Point 
Salt Company ("Lake Point"). 
5. Engineering Associates, Inc., an engineering firm 
now known by the name of ESI Engineering, Inc., was retained in 
May of 1982 to provide engineering design of the salt washing 
facilities at the Salt Wash Plant, including conveyors. 
6. ESI Engineering prepared two drawings that 
depicted the transfer conveyor. These drawings did not include 
details for the transfer conveyor describing the type of tail 
pulley, the type of idlers, whether the tail pulley was 
self-cleaning or non self-cleaning, or the type of conveyor 
belt or conveyor belt splice to be used. ESI's drawings of the 
transfer conveyor also did not include a tail pulley guard. 
ESI designed the frame of the transfer conveyor using an open 
web steel joint frame. 
1. Lake Point had considerable experience in the 
construction of conveyors. Lake Point's construction crew 
constructed the transfer conveyor. Its construction crew used 
its discretion in determining which parts to order for the 
operating components of the transfer conveyor not shown on 
ESI's drawings, such as the tail pulley, the idlers, the 
conveyor belts and conveyor belt splice. 
8. Lake Point's construction crew constructed the 
transfer conveyor with a drum pulley (non self-cleaning), 
without training idlers, without a plow scraper for the lower 
belt and with a mechanically spliced nylon-corded rubber belt, 
9. ESI was not retained by Lake Point to provide any 
engineering design of the electrical circuitry or electrical 
controls for the transfer conveyor or for any other portion of 
the Salt Wash Plant. 
10. The electrical circuitry and electrical controls 
for the Salt Wash Plant were provided to Lake Point by its 
in-house electrician, Ernest LaVar Gunderson. In designing the 
electrical controls and circuitry for the Salt Wash Plant, 
LaVar Gunderson did not design a safety kill switch for the 
transfer conveyor. A safety kill switch is comprised of two 
switches at the ends of the conveyor which are attached by a 
pull rope. When the pull rope is tugged, power is cut off to 
the entire Salt Wash Plant. LaVar Gunderson did design safety 
kill switches for other conveyors at the Salt Wash Plant. The 
decision not to include an electrical kill switch on the 
transfer conveyor was made by LaVar Gunderson. Mr. Gunderson 
knew that OSHA required kill switches on conveyors, and he 
intended that all conveyors, including the transfer conveyor, 
have kill switches. Mr. Gunderson decided to delay the 
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installation of a kill switch on the transfer conveyor due to 
economic considerations. 
11. ESI's drawings of the transfer conveyor depict an 
open web steel joist frame. Sheet 2 of Exhibit 1 to the 
Deposition of Verl Young reflecting ESI's design of an open web 
steel joist transfer conveyor (the drawing refers to the 
transfer conveyor as the "collection conveyorH) was identified 
as Exhibit W3M during argument of the Motion. The construction 
crew of Lake Point initially constructed the transfer conveyor 
with an open web steel joist frame. A photograph of the 
transfer conveyor taken by J. Frank Bonell in late June 1983 or 
early July, 1983/ during the final stages of construction of 
the Salt Wash Plant, was attached as Exhibit HAM to ESI's Reply 
Memorandum and was identified as Exhibit "4" during the 
argument of the Motion. This photograph shows that an open web 
steel joist frame was constructed by Lake Point in 1983. 
12. The Salt Wash Plant was operated seasonally from 
approximately April to October, depending upon the weather. 
The Salt Wash Plant was operated with the open web steel joist 
frame transfer conveyor during the 1983, 1984 and part of the 
1985 season. 
13. During its use, the open web steel frame transfer 
conveyor operated without unusual tracking difficulties. A 
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conveyor is said to "track" when the conveyor belt moves from 
side to side and does not stay centered on the pulleys. 
14. Build-up of material on the tail pulley of a 
conveyor can cause a conveyor belt to track. To prevent the 
transfer conveyor from tracking while the open web steel joist 
frame was used in the seasons of 1983, 1984 and a part of 1985, 
a fresh water hose was attached to the frame of the transfer 
conveyor with baling wire and allowed to spray on the top side 
of the lower belt cleaning the top side of the lower belt 
before it returned upon the tail pulley. 
15. Some time during the 1985 season, the frame of 
the transfer conveyor was changed from the open web steel joist 
frame shown in Exhibit "3H and Exhibit H4" to a channel iron 
frame shown in the Utah Occupational Safety and Health (UOSH) 
photographs of the transfer conveyor taken after the accident. 
Exhibit 4B-4 to the Donald Anderson deposition, a UOSH 
photograph of the transfer conveyor taken on the day of the 
accident, was identified as Exhibit 2 during the argument of 
the Motion. It reflects that a channel iron frame transfer 
conveyor, not the open web steel joist frame transfer conveyor 
reflected in Exhibits "3W and "4H to the Motion, was in place 
on the day of the accident. 
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16. Some time during the 1984 or 1985 season, a 
second modification was made to the transfer conveyor. The 
fresh water hose which had been used to clean the top side of 
the lower belt of the transfer conveyor was moved from the 
transfer conveyor to a location below the wire mesh conveyor to 
operate in conjunction with a sucking fan. 
17. Gary Hunt operated the Salt Wash Plant during the 
1984 and 1985 seasons. During the 1985 season after the frame 
was changed, considerable difficulties were experienced by Mr. 
Hunt in the operation of the transfer conveyor. The transfer 
conveyor tracked excessively because the frame was bent during 
its installation. 
18. In an effort to clean the top side of the lower 
belt as it returned to the tail pulley to reduce the amount of 
tracking of the transfer conveyor, the week of or the week 
prior to the accident an employee of the Salt Wash Plant 
constructed a belt scraping device. The belt scraping device 
was constructed of a 2 to 3 foot piece 2x4 which had nailed to 
its face a piece of nylon conveyor belt which hung down 8M to 
10" from the 2x4. The 2x4 scraping device was placed in the 
frame of the transfer conveyor, secured by the HuprightM shown 
by the arrow on Exhibit 4C of the Donald Anderson deposition, 
such that the belt flap scraped the top side of the lower belt 
before it reached the tail pulley. 
19. Gary Hunt was injured by the transfer conveyor 
while taking action in an attempt to correct excessive tracking 
of the conveyor. Gary Hunt's testimony as to his actions prior 
to the accident are as follows: 
(a) Several days prior to the accident/ Gary 
Hunt had noticed that the two ends of the transfer 
conveyor belt which were mechanically fastened to make 
one continuous belt had chunks missing from each end 
of the belt on one edge. The missing chunks exposed 
the mechanical fastener on the one edge as shown in 
Exhibit "1" to Gary Hunt's deposition. The mechanical 
fastener was an alligator clamp fastener, which is 
comprised of two clamps, one of which is attached to 
each end of the belt. The fasteners are then 
interlocked like a door hinge and a rod is inserted to 
hold the two ends of the belt together. 
(b) Just prior to the accident, Gary Hunt 
noticed that the flap of the 2x4 scraper had flipped 
under and instead of scraping salt from the belt was 
smoothing the salt without removing it. 
(c) Immediately prior to the accident, Gary Hunt 
was standing 3 to 4 feet from the tail pulley and 
facing southwest. He used a stick held in his left 
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hand/ which he found on the ground to poke at the flap 
to move it into proper position. He poked the stick 
to the south, away from the tail pulley, at the back 
side of the scraper. While doing so# Gary Hunt's left 
hand was caught by the rod of the mechanical fastening 
device on the belt and pulled toward the tail pulley. 
(d) Gary Hunt was spun around so that his back 
side was against the frame of the transfer conveyor 
with his left hand moving with the belt toward the 
tail pulley. He grabbed the frame with his right hand 
and with all the strength of both arms and his body 
attempted to pull free of the belt. He was unable to 
do so and was pulled off his feet up onto the frame 
while his left hand and arm went into the nip (pinch) 
point of the tail pulley and were pulled around the 
pulley. 
(e) A total of 3 to 4 seconds elapsed between 
the time Gary Hunt was first caught by the belt and 
the time his hand went into the nip point of the tail 
pulley. 
Other witnesses testified Gary Hunt was taking other 
action to prevent excessive tracking of the transfer conveyor 
at the time of the accident. These actions are as follows: 
- ^ 
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(a) Gary Hunt was throwing salt into the tail 
pulley at the time of the accident and got too close 
to the nip point; 
(b) Gary Hunt was sticking a 2x4 against the 
tail pulley and was inadvertently pulled in. 
20. ESI last performed engineering services on the 
Salt Wash Plant on June 29, 1983. ESI was not advised or 
consulted about tracking problems of the transfer conveyor 
prior to the accident. 
21. It did not fall below the standard of care 
ordinarily exercised by professional engineers in the state of 
Utah in 1982-1983 to design the transfer conveyor initially 
without a self-cleaning pulley, training idlers, a plow 
scrapper or a vulcanized spliced belt. 
22. On the day following the accident, Lake Point 
maintenance crews fabricated a guard on the tail pulley of the 
transfer conveyor and installed a self-cleaning pulley. A 
photograph of the tail pulley guard installed after the 
accident is marked as Exhibit "4CH of the Donald Anderson 
Deposition. 
23. The tail pulley guard installed after the 
accident shown in Anderson Deposition Exhibit 4C was accepted 
by Utah Occupational Safety and Health (HUOSHH) as complying 
with Section 182.1.2 of the UOSH Rules and Regulations, General 
Standards, for the guarding of tail pulleys of belt conveyors. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ISSUE I 
1. It is a condition precedent to liability of ESI 
for negligent design of the transfer conveyor, that ESI have 
actually designed the transfer conveyor which caused 
Plaintiff's injuries and that the conveyor have been 
constructed in substantial conformance with ESI's design. 
Balcom Industries, Inc. v. Nelson, 454 P.2d 599 (Colo. 1969); 
Weston v. New Bethal Missionary Baptist Church, 598 P.2d 411 
(Wash. App. 1979). 
2. Where it is uncontroverted that ESI's drawing 
prepared in 1982-1983 of the transfer conveyor (Exhibit H3M to 
the Motion) provided the frame design, with Lake Point 
designing the operating components of the conveyor, Lake Point 
originally constructed the transfer conveyor with the frame 
designed by ESI, the frame was changed when the transfer 
conveyor was reconstructed in 1985 with a channel iron frame, 
and the change in the frame changed the operating 
characteristics of the transfer conveyor, causing excessive 
tracking, the Court concludes that Plaintiff was not injured by 
the transfer conveyor designed by ESI. 
- ^< 
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3. Where it is uncontroverted that Plaintiff's 
injuries were sustained while he was taking action in an 
attempt to remedy the excessive tracking of the channel iron 
frame transfer conveyor constructed in*1985 without ESI's 
involvement, caused in part by a bend in the frame, the Court 
concludes that Plaintiff's injuries were not proximately caused 
by any negligence of ESI in the design or construction of the 
open web steel joist transfer conveyor without a tail pulley 
guard, an electrical kill switch, a self-cleaning pulley, a 
plow scraper, training idlers or a vulcanized spliced belt. 
4. There is no genuine issue of material fact and 
ESI is entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of law 
dismissing with prejudice and on the merits Plaintiff's Second 
Amended Complaint against ESI. 
ISSUE II 
5. ESI had no contractual or other duty to design 
electrical controls or electrical circuitry for the transfer 
conveyor. 
6. Where it is uncontroverted that Lake Point 
assumed the duty of designing and installing the electrical 
controls and electrical circuitry for the Salt Wash Plant and 
actually installed electrical kill switches on conveyors other 
than the transfer conveyor at this Salt Wash Plant, the Court 
concludes that expert testimony of a professional engineer as 
to the practice in the industry of installing electrical kill 
switches on material handling conveyors is insufficient to cast 
upon ESI responsibility for the failure of Lake Point to design 
and install such electrical controls. Linder v. Combustion 
Engineering, Inc., 315 So. 2d 199, 200 (Fla App. 1975). 
7. Where it is uncontroverted that Lake Point's 
electrician, LaVar Gunderson, was aware that the installation 
of an electrical kill switch on the transfer conveyor was an 
OSHA safety requirement and LaVar Gunderson intended to install 
an electrical kill switch on the transfer conveyor but had 
delayed doing so due to budgetary constraints, the Court 
concludes ESI had no duty to warn Lake Point of the dangers of 
the absence of the installation of an electrical kill switch on 
the transfer conveyor. Lamer v. Torgerson Corporation, 613 
P.2d 780 (Wash. 1980). The Court further concludes that ESI's 
failure to warn of such dangers was not a proximate cause of 
Plaintiff's injuries. Beach v. University of Utah. 726 P.2d 
413 (Utah 1986) . 
8. There is no genuine issue of material fact and 
ESI is entitled to Partial Summary Judgment as a matter of law 
dismissing with prejudice and on the merits Plaintiff's claim 
of negligence against ESI for failing to design the transfer 
-7-TJ 
conveyor with an electrical kill switch and for failing to warn 
Lake Point of the dangers of the absence of an electrical kill 
switch on the transfer conveyor. 
ISSUE III 
9. ESI was not negligent in failing to initially 
design the transfer conveyor with a self-cleaning pulley, 
training idlers, a plow scraper or a vulcanized spliced belt. 
10. Where it is uncontroverted that ESI last 
performed engineering services on the Salt Wash Plant in June, 
1983, the transfer conveyor did not begin to track excessively 
until the summer of 1985 and ESI was not informed of the 
excessive tracking of the transfer conveyor, the Court 
concludes that ESI was not negligent in failing to recommend 
the use of a self-cleaning pulley, training idlers, a plow 
scraper or a vulcanized spliced belt to remedy the excessive 
tracking of the transfer conveyor. 
11. There is no genuine issue of material fact and 
ESI is entitled to Partial Summary Judgment as a matter of law 
dismissing with prejudice and on the merits Plaintiff's claim 
of negligence against ESI for failing to design the transfer 
conveyor with a self-cleaning pulley, training idlers, a plow 
scraper and/or a vulcanized spliced belt. 
-JL8-
ISSUE IV 
12. Genuine issues of material, fact exist whether any 
t. d 1 I p u l l e y i|Udu1 wuulil I M V I : prevt-i n t e«.J 'i n i u i i i •:, s u l l e r e d hy 
Plaintiff. 
DATED this 1/ ^ day of. W ' -• . 1989. 
Pat B. Brian 
District Judge 
J. 9-
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SUMMARY 
Gary H u n t ' s ami was c r u s h e d in -i i imiarded l a i I p u l l e y 
on a c o n v e y e r . He brought t h i s a c t i o n a g a i n s t ESI E n g i n e e r i n g 
aJ l eg j . nn • • .- p r o v i d e d t h e p l a n s f o r t h e c o n v e y e r . ESI 
Engineer ii--. :-.^ •. moved f o r sumnicn y JUI LJIIKM- ' i l l ' 1 \\\v\ i I i t .hat 
t h e y d i d imt d e s i g n t h e c o n v e y e r ; (2) t h a t t h e d e s i g n was not 
i u 1. i.< ivvnd; 11 in I i ; aard a i d n o t c a u s e G a r y ' s 
i n j u r y . 
The motion should be denied because there is evidence 
in the record that (1) ESI's blueprint drawing was used in 
making the conveyer on which Gary was hurt; (2) any variations 
from the blueprint were approved by ESI and are not material 
to the accident; and (3) a guard would have prevented injury to 
Gary's arm, 
DISPUTED FACTS 
(Paragraph numbers are taken from corresponding 
paragraphs in ESI's motion.) 
5. Plaintiff objects to the characterization of ESI 
Engineering/ Inc.'s duties as "retained to provide design, as 
directedo" This implies ESI only did what Lake Point Salt Co. 
told them. Actually, Lake Point Salt Co. relied on ESI's 
expertise and designs: 
We hire these people [ESI] as we need them 
to give us their expertise on plant design 
and the conveyor designs and—Palmer, p. 
29, 30. 
Q. . -Did Lake Point, at the time of 
construction of the salt wash plant have 
any licensed engineers on its payroll? 
A. No, that's why we retained Mr. Bonell. 
(Palmer depo. I, p. 29, 30.) 
6. Plaintiff objects to ESI's characterization of 
ESI's drawing as preliminary or a "concept" sketch. ESI's 
drawing was not merely a "concept" drawing; it had the words 
2 
"released for construe-. i<. s - .;. — 
profession, that means the pn-ms ai-j released tor u.cc 
str ucti on. ES* * - '-• . " ^ie nu- p- ^  1 im; ~iary, because they 
were intended *. i *= uc^c ;*> jomtar .* • *- * • t liny wh«if" in. 
7. The use of the word "fabricate" i? possibly 
misleading. ,M ,•: ;•. ,** wi tness> to mean 
putting the parts together, not to include the design of 
conveyor. 
Q. By fabricate, du ynu in* 
pieces together? 
A. That . ; . q,,f 
(Palmer depo* 
There i '. 7 P0.1 n 1" F-«i 1 I 
experience •. desigr fabricating, 
design to j \ it * - - ^ieces together. 
2 ~ , n• " fact' 
cause Gary's injuries) j s disputed 
t
 ; _.:, .-;. drd installed after the accident would 
Gary Hunt's acc.uent or iniuries. V 
engineer William Petersen testified: 
Q. T1 iat"s not the type of occurrence t]iat 
a guard is intended to prevent -- Is i t?--
getting caught by the belt itself ? 
•i ad considerable 
fol .>• •' na a i.e. 
s argument t~<-.\ 
\av-f preven1 ed 
A* no, 
3 
I think if this guy's going to get 
caught, that — The guard is there to keep 
the guy from getting to the nip point. And 
any way he's pulled into it, th€> most 
logical way he's going to get pulled into 
it is somehow getting hooked on the belt. 
Q. If he gets hooked on the belt and he 
is pulled up onto the belt itself, he could 
go into the nip point. You've already 
described that that is possible. 
A. If he could get around it. But as 
soon as he gets to the edge of the guard, 
his body would stop. In this case, it may 
have pulled his thumb off, but I don't 
think he would have gotten into the nip 
point. 
Q. Why couldn't it just have pulled his 
whole arm off? 
A. I think the — the peeling of the skin 
off the thumb would come before it would 
pull the arm out of the socket. 
* * * * 
Q. If his whole hand was caught by the 
belt splice wire, would it be possible that 
his whole hand or his arm would have been 
pulled off if we had the guard as you've 
shown? 
A. I think it would have just pulled 
flesh off rather than pulled members off. 
(William Petersen depo., p. 63-65.)(Emphasis added.) 
Vincent Gallagher, an expert in OSHA regulations 
(which include machine guarding) similarly testified: 
Q. . . .How would the guard have 
prevented the accident if his hand became 
engaged in the belt and moved towards the 
4 
1>7 
nip point and then got eauyfii in MH I IMJ 
point? 
A• We11, it would have prevented him from 
having his arm extend far enough to be able 
to get into the ingoing nip point, it would 
not have prevented injury to h is hand. 
(Vincent Gallagher depo., p. 90.)(Emphasis added.) 
SUPPLEMENTAL FACTS 
1 i •] a r y ' s vers i o n o f f; I»e ('accident is n o t: 
undisputed. others have testified that Gar) vis throwing sci I l 
:DLO the tall pulley and inadvertently got too close to the njp 
z .
 ,r::M" IOF.CPH ijp|ir , 11 u"), *S 1 ; Bolinder depo,, j: 38 ) 
Alternatively, they have said Gary was sticking 
a 2 X -< against the tail pulley and was Inadvertently pulled 
in, ( . • . • -
accident thought Gary had * rt:ic< . s ! :r.i w;._ .: n - - • 
become uauym ui u : ** r\ * pulled Gary' : hand , (Cutler 
depo n -^7 ^ - . , ^ .-.i^.j t i 1 iei 
versions il i" ^ffidavi* «j >\s r^ * analyze vhemer a gua: . 
wo • - '•" • - ury ui these ut.hei_ situations• 
ARGUMENT 
LAKE POINT SALT FOLLOWED ESIfS 
DESIGN IN FABRICATING THE CONVEYOR ON WHICH" GARY GOT HURT 
ESI argues that it did n< ^  desigr • r •- conveyer 
question, . • • ^  ,. • • * . - *** • ;. 
5 
V 
specific part to be used in building the conveyor. However, 
the drawings were used to show what to build, even if they 
didn't specify what to built it with. 
1. Lake Point Relied on ESI's Expertise: 
Lake Point hired ESI because of its "expertise" in 
conveyor design. "We hire these people [ESI] as we need them 
to give us their expertise on. . .conveyor designs. 
(Palmer depo. I, p. 29, 30.) "They're licensed engineers and 
have had many years of experience in that area [plant design 
and conveyor design] so we do utilize them as we need them. . 
(Id. at p. 30.) Lake Point had no licensed engineers, so 
it hired ESI. (Id. at p. 30.) 
2. Lake Point Used and Followed ESIrs Blueprints in 
Fabricating the Conveyor on Whcih Gary was Hurt. 
Gary was hurt on the unguarded tail pulley of the 
transfer conveyor. (ESI's Undisputed Facts, para. 3.) Lake 
Point received a blueprint showing the design for the transfer 
conveyor. (Palmer depo., p. 27, Exhibit 1.) Lake Point got 
the transfer conveyor blueprint "from ESI Engineering, Mr. 
Bonell." (Palmer depo., p. 29.) Lake Point used the ESI 
blueprint to fabricate the transfer conveyor. "In ordering the 
parts definitely we'll use it [the ESI blueprint] to refer to 
6 
wh a t we n e e d e d ;::*! !i * :1 1 ] »<::" s i z e :> f 11 i e j : \ i ] 1 e y s ai id every til i i ng . " 
(Palmer depo., ; : (Emphasis added.) 
The most tel_:ng evidence •*'£ Uake ramc o reliance on 
the ESI drawing . ::-.::•: the ESI :. n : PC ad no ouard around 
the tail pulley' *!••- transfer conveyor 5 s .;;. • ~ a: r- :ua : 
ar . *
 ; Evei i i f -l * " • * ••: * • '' ! 1 ow 
the blueprint. . every other respec- . ic. lowed us. ^ design 
i i • fi*-r mos* imporian' respect, the failure ~o include JL g-i.: 
a t . • - . 
3 . ESI Approved the Construction of the Transfer Conveyor. 
Whether or not Lake Point, ionowed the ESI blueprints 
in every respect,. ESI nevertheless approved 
constructic ; transfer conveyor. : SI us^r -e*: v -
c . : t . 
conveyor is a part). (Palmer depo. . : n / L^:.:*J::, 
Mr. Bonell. . observed the construction, of the transverse 
conveyor , . . " ; p 3 2 ) ESI :i nspecteci 1:1 iP f : i i 11shed pr*.Mi ut t• of 
the wash plant after it was completed, and \ \ operation (Id. at 
p. 32.) Despite this, personal knowledge, Mr. Bonell never 
mentioned the lac) : «>. :: -i ,mard aroun-* . • . . ; ,.J.9v or the 
•'•The bend in the conveyor frame issue raised by ESI is a red 
herring. The tail pulley should have had a guard and a kill 
switch whether or not a frame was of a web joist style or was 
slightly bent in construction. 
7 
absence of a safety kill switch- (^ d. at p. 34, 35.) A jury 
could find negligence in Mr. Bonell's tacit and knowing 
approval of the construction of the transfer conveyor without 
safety devices. See generally William Petersen affidavit, 
3/23/89. 
ESI HAD A DUTY TO WARN LAKE POINT 
ABOUT THE NEED FOR A SAFETY KILL SWITCH 
Domtar did the electrical design for the conveyor. 
ESI was hired to do the general design of the conveyor, because 
of its expertise in conveyor design. (Palmer depo. I, p. 29-
30.) The transfer conveyor never had an electrical safety kill 
switch (a cable running the length of the conveyor which 
automatically shuts off the conveyor when it is tripped). 
(Gundersen depo., p. 36.) William Petersen, plaintiff's 
engineer, testified that this is a design defect. (William 
Petersen depo., p. 39.) However, when ESI inspected the 
transfer conveyor as it was being built, and after it was 
completed (Palmer depo., II, p. 17,32), it never informed or 
advised Jim Palmer (the person responsible for the plant 
construction) that the lack of a safety kill switch was a 
design defect. (Palmer depo. II, p. 34-35.) A jury could find 
that a reasonable engineer, in reviewing the completed plant, 
would point out to his client an important design defect such 
8 
a s a m i s s i n g s a t e t y k i J J i:> w i t i. h , w h e t h e ,i" c»r in.»t t (i H I • 1 i i a n t 11 <. ,i < I 
specificai;1 as/:*?d the engineer to design the switch. See 
general]*. ,<±m Petersen affidavit, 3/23/89. 
A PROPER GUARD AROUND THE TAIL PULLEY 
WOULD HAVE PREVENTED GARY'S INJURY 
ESI claims that t, lie absence of a guard played no part 
i i i c a i i s i i :i • :j G a r y s . ' P1 a I n 1: i £ f " s e x p e i: t s b e .1 i e J e 
otherwise. (See Disputed Fact #2 7 , supra; Wi 1.11 am Petersen 
depc : *•<'.) Nor does ESI address whether a safety kill 
switch would have prevented the accident , -. • . Supreme 
Court has repeatedly warned that "proximate cause - -s,a.. 
i -r iTic s; t ci r cumsta i ices wi ] - *• ' 
as a matter of law ", Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 7 06 
P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985)- This case poses i 10 exception. 
CONCLUSION 
Negligence cases are rarely subject to summary 
dismissal. Williams \ Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985). 
ESI's .niotioi i, should be denied and the case sent to a iurv, 
DATED this rQ$MJday of _ _ Jl/fliftM _ , 19 89. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOC I ATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
DANIEL F. BERTCH 
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1 the negligence of any party caused this accident? 
2 MR, BERTCH: I object to the use of the word 
3 "negligence" as a legal term of art of which the witness 
4 has not shown of having any familiarity with, plus it calls 
5 for a legal conclusion. 
6 MR. MARIGER: I'll ask questions about that. 
7 Q (By Mr. Mariger) Are you familiar with what the 
8 word "negligence" means? 
9 MR. BERTCH: As a legal term of art, or do you mean in 
10 common parlance? 
11 MR. MARIGER: Ifm asking him if he knows what the term 
12 "negligence" means. If you don't like the question, object 
13 to it. 
14 MR. BERTCH: And I am objecting to it, if you're 
15 asking it as to its meaning as a legal term of art or its 
16 meaning in common-pedestrian usage. 
17 So that's my objection. If the witness 
18 understands what you mean by "negligence," I suppose he may 
19 answer. 
20 Q (By Mr. Mariger) You may answer. Your counsel 
21 is just objecting for the record. 
22 A I can only answer from what I think is the 
23 negligent situation. 
24 Q Tell me what you think negligence means. 
25 A Somebody not doing what they should have done. 
Certified Shorthand Reporters 3 7 
1 Q Okay, 
2 Have you formulated any opinions or conclusions 
3 whether any of the parties in this case were negligent 
4 using that definition? 
5 A The conveyor was not complete in that it didn't 
6 have a return-pulley guard, it did not have an appropriate 
7 pull-cord system for stopping it in case of emergency. 
8 It was evident that the belt was wandering 
9 excessively, so the — the maintenance crew was negligent 
10 in correcting that situation/ which required a wing pulley, 
11 training idlers and possibly a good belt wiper wiping the 
12 belt before it went onto the pulley. 
13 The operator himself from his testimony is 
14 young, unschooled, not taught about conveyors, not 
15 supervised under watchful eyes. I suspect he didn't know 
16 the OSHA standards, he didn't know what he was even 
17 supposed to know; I mean, like, I don't know whether he 
18 even knew OSHA standards existed. I suspect he didn't know 
19 that a belt conveyor could run without problems, because I 
20 don't see in his testimony any recommendations he made that 
21 would indicate that he knew how to fix them. 
22 As well as not being maintained, apparently the 
23 conveyor system wasn't built right in the first place — or 
24 built complete, so the equipment itself had problems. 
25 So the system itself had problems, there was 
]Ufl QJUfflS$0(iQ?e$ Certified Shorthand Reporters 3 g 
1 problems with maintenance, there was problems with design 
2 and there was problems in operation, that the operator 
3 wasnft schooled to run it. 
4 Q Why don't we talk first about the negligence in 
5 the design. 
6 What in your opinion should have been in the 
7 design that wasn't in the design? 
8 A The standard design practice requires the pinch 
9 points of the head pulley and the tail pulley to be guarded 
10 from. It also requires design of the drive system being 
11 guarded. 
12 In this case, the drive system was guarded, the 
13 head pulley was not — but it may not have needed to be 
14 because it can be considered guarded if it's so high, which 
15 is common — but the tail pulley was not guarded. 
16 Q Is there anything else? 
17 When we're talking, I'm separating design from 
18 construction, operation, the other factors you've talked 
19 about; I'm just taking design. 
20 Is there anything else that should have been in 
21 the design that wasn't? 
22 A A safety system — -switch system should have 
23 been on there. 
24 And when it became aware that the belt was 
25 having any difficulty in tracking, it should have had 
6urf ail{Cy%$$OCi(l?$ Certified Shorthand Reporters 3 9 
1 training idlers* And when it became aware that there was 
2 belt spilling — salt spilling and getting back into the 
3 tail pulley, the tail pulley should have been a wing-type 
4 pulley, and there should have been a proper belt wiper to 
5 keep the salt from building up on the belt. 
6 Q Anything else from the design point of view? 
7 A There should have been — In an operation like 
8 this, where itfs a permanent-type operation, you'd expect 
9 to put in a vulcanized splice and not a mechanical belt 
10 splice* I assume therefs only one splice on the belt. 
11 But when belts start to get problems, it's 
12 typically first at a mechanical splice, if there is one, 
13 and it's evident that the belt was getting frayed and 
14 coming apart at the splice. 
15 Q Let's take these in the order that you've 
16 identified them. 
17 Are there any more? Sometimes you're answering 
18 slowly, and I don't want to cut off your answer. 
19 A That would have been sufficient to make it work 
20 without problems. 
21 Q You said standard design practice requires the 
22 pinch points of the head and the tail pulley to be guarded. 
23 By stating "standard design practice," are you 
24 referencing the practice in your profession, are you 
25 J referencing OSHA standards, what are you referencing? 
Certified Shorthand Reporters A Q 
1 A Practice in the profession* 
2 Q Okay. 
3 A The practice in the profession has got to have 
4 some knowledge of OSHA standards. OSHA is a minimum, but 
5 usually it's more than — you do more them what OSHA would 
6 require. 
7 Q At Pemco when you were designing conveyor 
8 systems, did you guard the pinch points of the head and the 
9 tail pulleys? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q What type of guards did you use? 
12 A Fabricated out of metal* Sometimes they are 
13 solid, and sometimes they are an expanded metal, where you 
14 could see into them, through them, but you couldn't get 
15 your hand through them. Usually sufficient enough covering 
16 so that you can't even reach into the pinch point if you 
17 tried to reach around it. 
18 And then head pulleys are just typically 
19 protected by the heighth. 
20 And usually you try and keep a — a pull cord 
21 along the length of it, close, so that you can reach it. 
22 Q What's the standard design practice, in your 
23 opinion — and I'm talking now about the standard in your 
24 profession in the state of Utah — what's the standard 
25 design practice of the size of the guard at the tail 
Certified Shorthand Reporters A 1 
1 construction? Thatfs the lower belt. 
2 A In — In design, yeah. 
3 Q Does the open-web steel joist, then, sort of act 
4 like a guard of the lower belt as it returns to the tail 
5 pulley? 
6 A To some degree. 
7 Q To a greater degree than the channel-iron frame 
8 shown in Exhibit 4-B-4, doesn't it? 
9 A No, I wouldnft say to any greater degree. 
10 You see, the channel probably covers — The 
11 belt, is probably right behind this channel on the channel 
12 type. 
13 Q You're showing that the belt in Exhibit 4-B-4 
14 would be about in the middle of the channel; is that 
15 correct? 
16 A It would go somewhere behind it. 
17 Q Okay. 
18 How far is the southern-most piece — 
19 And you can see some dimensions on this drawing. 
20 I'm assuming that you're using those dimensions in 
21 Exhibit 3, but, just to make sure, I don't want to trick 
22 you or anything. 
23 It looks to me like you've made this extension 
24 about three feet from the pinch point of the tail pulley. 
25 A Well, I would say it's closer to four feet. 
Certified Shorthand Reporters g \ 
1 A Well/ say this was two-foot. This could be — 
2 be a two-foot take-up, a three-foot take-up. If it's in — 
3 So four feet's pretty close, because if it was two feet, 
4 that gives three feet from the worse case to the ends of 
5 the guard. So that would be reasonable. 
6 Q Okay. 
7 You've read the deposition testimony of Mr. Hunt 
8 that he was actually caught by the belt itself. Do you 
9 recall that testimony? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q That's a pretty unusual occurrence, is it not? 
12 A I would say it's quite rare. 
13 Q That's not the type of occurrence that a guard 
14 is intended to prevent — Is it? — getting caught by the 
15 belt itself? 
16 A No. 
17 I think if this guy's going to get caught, that -
18 The guard is there to keep the guy from getting to the nip 
19 point. And any way he's pulled into it, the most logical 
20 way he's going to get pulled into it is somehow getting 
21 hooked on the belt. 
22 Q If he gets hooked on the belt and he is pulled 
23 up onto the belt itself, he could go into the nip point. 
24 You've already described that that is possible. 
25 A If he could get around it. But as soon as he 
Certified Shorthand Reporters c *5 
1 gets to the edge of the guard, his body would stop. In 
2 this case, it may have pulled his thumb off, but I don't 
3 think he would have gotten into the nip point. 
4 Q Why couldn't it just have pulled his whole arm 
5 off? 
6 A I think the — the peeling of the skin off the 
7 thumb would come before it would pull the arm out of the 
8 socket. 
9 Q Mr. Hunt would have had enough strength to have 
10 pulled the skin off his thumb, would he not? 
11 A I don't know. 
12 Q Is it your — 
13 A I suspect you could hang — I suspect you could 
14 even hang on your own weight by your thumb. I'd have to do 
15 some studying to determine that. 
16 Q What makes you think that Mr. Hunt was only 
17 grabbed by the thumb? 
18 A It was my understanding he got his thumb caught 
19 in the — in the wire that was roving out of the — the 
20 belt splice. 
21 Q If his whole hand was caught by the belt splice 
22 wire, would it be possible that his whole hand or his arm 
23 would have been pulled off if we had the guard as you've 
24 shown? 
25 A I think it would have just pulled flesh off 
W^y Qn£fl&0Cial& Certify Shorthand Reporters g 4 
1 rather than pulled members off. 
2 Q why do you believe that? 
3 A Just the physical construction of the hand and 
4 the way things are. I think if you start pulling around 
5 like this, what you'll do is you'll — is you'll pull the 
6 skin off to get — As it comes off, maybe you get to a 
7 joint, maybe you might break out of the joint. 
8 But it's like skinning a chicken. The skin 
9 comes off before the — you disembody the members. 
10 Q You said that you weren't shown Exhibit 4-B-2. 
11 A No. I think that one I've seen somewhere, but 
12 it may have been a close-up of this one. It wasn't this 
13 one, it was one like it. 
14 Q 4-B-2, the testimony is that that's an 
15 indication of where Mr. Hunt's arm was. 
16 A Yeah. You can see he really got caught in 
17 there. 
18 Q Is the location of that mark consistent, in your 
19 opinion, with having Mr. Hunt caught on that lacing, or on 
20 that rod, at the edge of the belt? 
21 A Well, see, apparently it entered at the exterior 
22 on the lacing, and somehow it pulled in. I don't know why 
23 it would have pulled in, but once his hand started reeling 
24 in there, heaven only knows what would have happened to it, 
25 Q All right. 
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1 If Mr, Hunt was caught by the belt itself and 
2 then drawn into the nip point of the conveyor, how would a 
3 guard have prevented this accident? 
4 A Well, there were two problems that I think are 
5 the primary problems with the design of the conveyor, and 
6 one was there was no emergency-stop cable, and the other 
7 was that there was no guard. 
8 Q I'm trying to break those down. I want to talk 
9 about stop cables after we take a break for Mr. Bertch. 
10 R^ht now I want to separate it and just talk about guards. 
11 How would the guard have prevented the accident 
12 if his hand became engaged in the belt and moved towards 
13 the nip point and then got caught in the nip point? 
14 A Well, it would have prevented him from having 
15 his arm extend far enough to be able to get into the 
16 ingoing nip point, it would not have prevented injury to 
17 his hand. 
18 *"| Q You're saying that a guard would have prevented 
19 more of his body than his hand from getting engaged in the 
20 nip point? Is that what you're saying? 
21 A If — If the guard were properly designed so 
22 that if that person standing alongside the conveyor reached 
23 they wouldn't be able to extend their hand far enough to 
24 get into the ingoing nip point. 
25 If Mr. Hunt's hand was being pulled towards the 
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A No. 
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1 you have any continuance type of operation. Otherwise, 
2 you're losing salt, 
3 Q So you had seen it, I guess, on occasion — spillage 
4 on the ground, of salt, at these prior projects? 
5 A I think so. I don't — I'm not looking at any 
6 specifics. The wire mesh belts are not loaded to the full 
7 extreme. And if they spill over, itTs designed to carry 
8 that away, so — on the other conveyors. At Exportadora 
9 de Sal, I was not involved in the rubber type belt conveyors 
10 I Q What type of conveyors do they use there? 
11 A I designed the ones for the wire mesh belts. 
12 Q Oh, okay. And that was the Exportadora? 
13 A Yes. And all of them. They all use wire mesh 
14 belts. 
15 Q They all use wire mesh? 
16 J A But some of them use a combination as a collection—-
as a collection conveyor to collect the discharge from the 
the wire mesh belts onto other type conveyors. 
19 0 Okay. Just so I?m understanding then; all of these 
20 other projects did use wire mesh belts; but some of them 
21 also used 5 at some point, rubber belts? 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q Now3 did you design the conveyor systems for these 
24 other five projects? Did I ask you that already? 
25 A Yes. 
43 
17 
18 
1 0 And did these other conveyor-systems on these-other 
2 salt projects — did they involve pulleys and — belt driver 
3 pulleys, I guess? 
4 A Yes. 
5 0 Were they designed with guards on the pulleys, these 
6 other five projects? 
7 I A Some were. Some were — Some of them are not expose^ 
8 I to — Some of them are not — You1re not able to put a guard 
9 I around the pulley because of the sheer location of the 
10 positioning of the conveyor. 
11 I 0 Did any of these other conveyor systems have emer-
12 I gency pull cords? Do you understand what I mean by chat? 
13 I A Yes. 
14 | Q Did any of the other conveyor systems on these other 
15 salt projects — did they have emergency pull cords? 
16 A Some did and some did not. 
17 Q Were some of these outside the United- States? 
18 A Yes. 
19 ! 0 Did the ones outside the United States have guards 
20 or pull cords? 
21 J A I don't recall. I know they had — in places where 
22 I there was exposure, they had guards. Pull cords were not 
23 always put on — or not always required; because either the 
24 heigth of the conveyor or the location of the conveyor as 
25 j to whether they are exposed to someone that would need a 
44 
1 projects other than the salt projects we We talked about? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q Have you ever designed conveyor systems with exposed 
4 pulleys? In other words, without guards? 
5 A Yes. 
6 0 And — 
7 A Depending on their location. 
8 I Q Take a moment and just briefly describe for me the 
9 situation then where you would put a — or have put a guard 
10 en the pulley and— and situation in which you have net. In 
11 other words, tell me when you do and when you don't in your 
12 practice. 
13 A If the pulley is in the position where it can come in 
14 direct contact with an individual, where he is working on or 
15 around it, it should be — have a guard on it. 
16 C If it's too high — 
17 A If it1s in a position where he can't logically 
18 hazard himself, then we haven't felt it necessary to put in 
19 a guard. 
20 Q Do you ever do electrical controls for machines? 
21 A We have. I do not do that, but we have had cases 
22 where we've had — might with other consultants, and do the 
23 electrical or someone else does the electrical. 
24 Q But no one in your office, though? 
25 A At one time Earl Jorgenson helped me on one job in 
58 
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of thing. 
Q (BY MR. BERTCK) Now you also brought with you a 
blueprint; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
C There were two of them I guess actually; is that 
right? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q Could we mark the blueprint that -- I want to 
mark yours if that's okay and I'll allow you keep it. 
MR. POELMAIJ: I was going to try tc use that as 
my copy because I don't have copies like you do. 
MR. BERTCH: I'll let you keep that but if we 
could mark that as Deposition Exhibit 1. 
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. 1 
was marked 
for identification.) 
Q (BY MR. BERTCH) Now I ask yci to identify what 
has been marked Deposition Exhibit 1. Just tell me what it 
is . 
A It's a print showing the wire mesh belt and the 
transverse conveyor. If you'd like to call it transfer 
conveyor that would be fine. 
Q I think that's what everyone else has called it. 
A Transfer, that's acceptable. 
MR. POELMAN: That distinguishes it from the 
other conveyors. 
28 
THE WITNESS: Transfer conveyor. 
Q (BY MR. BERTCH) Now was this the blueprint 
that was used in fabricating the belt, the transfer belt 
conveyor? Did I get that right? 
A With the stipulation that I made before that we 
will use standard parts here but we might change this 
configuration to our convenience but generally the length 
was okay and, yeah — 
Q You did change the -- what's the base of it or 
what do you call that? 
A The general frame. 
Q Sc ycu didn't follow the blueprint in making the 
frame? 
A We will not necessarily follow this exact 
configuration. We might put a channel iron frame there or 
something. 
Q What kir.i of frame does the blueprint call for? 
A It shows a web frame. 
Q And what, kind of frame was actually built? 
A Looked like we went to a channel iron frame 
which is a little better rubber construction. 
Q Were there any other substantial or significant 
differences between the transfer belt conveyor as drawn on 
this exhibit and the way it was actually built? 
A No, looks like -- pretty good. I notice he 
29 
1 calls that the collection conveyor. 
2 J Q Now you understand why I get so confused so 
easily. 
A Yes, I know. I understand. 
5 I 0 Whc drafted the blueprint that's Deposition 
6 I Exhibit 1 do you know? 
A I do not know who drew it. 
Q Who did you get it from? 
A I got it from ESI Engineering, Mr. Bonell. 
10 I Q Do you remember actually the event of getting 
11 I the blueprint? Is that something that you can recall at 
this time? 
12 I A No, I don't remember. 
14 Q Did ESI do any other design work for you on the 
.5 salt wash plant? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q Tell me what else they did in terms of design? 
18 A The wire mesh belts and the general stockpile 
19 system, overall stockpile system and the structure for the 
20 bin structure. 
21 Q Now, you've told me what they did and I guess 
22 this may be slightly different; what was the assignment or 
23 contract that they had? What was their assignment to do for 
24 Lake Point Salt if you know? Do you understand my question? 
25 A I think I do. I hope I can answer it. We hire 
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1 Q Okay. 
2 Would you tell me what opinions or conclusions 
3 you have rendered with regard to this case* 
4 I A It's my opinion that the conveyor system where 
5 Mr. Hunt was injured was unreasonably dangerous for a 
6 number of reasons. 
7 Q Would you tell me those reasons. 
8 A The ingoing nip point at the tail pulley was 
9 completely exposed. It should have been guarded. And 
10 there's abundant references in the safety literature that 
11 give direction to engineers on how to avoid that hazardous 
12 area. 
13 There's a problem with that conveyor insofar as 
14 it had no emergency-stop cable that could be used by an 
15 employee in an emergency to stop the movement of the 
16 conveyor. 
17 There were also other problems with the conveyor 
18 that would cause Mr. Hunt or any other employee to find 
19 themselves in that area. For instance,, the device used to 
20 clean was not a fixed part of the equipmentf it was not 
21 well-engineered and could lead to a buildup of material on 
22 the tail pulley. 
23 The tail pulley itself was designed in a way 
24 where it could collect materialf where it could have been 
25 designed in a way that the material would not tend to 
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collect there, so it would not tend to have the belt come 
off the tail pulley. 
Q Anything else? 
A I think it was a very unsafe design, it was an 
invitation to injury. 
Q Any other particulars, though, about what made 
it unsafe? 
A I think I covered it fairly well. I can't think 
of any other particular reasons. 
Q Okay. 
You talked about a device used to clean out the 
belt wasn't a fixed device and it wasn't well-engineered 
and it could lead to a buildup of material. 
Are you referring to the 2-by-4 scraping device? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
collect 
Yes, sir. 
Do you know who designed that? 
No, sir. 
Do you know who installed it? 
No, sir. 
You said that the tail pulley was designed to 
material. How was it designed so it would collect 
material? 
A That's a — I used the words incorrectly there. 
It was designed in a way — Let me say: It was 
not designed in a way that would prohibit or preclude the 
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CASTMASTER, DIV ISION OF I I.P M 
CORP., a/k/a H.P.M. Division of Cast 
master, I, n c., D e f e n d a n t - A p p e 11 a n t, 
Supreme Court of New Jersey. 
Argued Oct, 24, 1983. 
Decided Dec. 21, 1984. 
Die-casting machine operator brought 
action against machine manufacturer for 
injuries suffered while operating machine. 
The Superior Court entered judgment of 
involuntary dismissal against operator, and 
operator appealed. The Superior Court, 
Appellate Division, reversed and remanded 
for trial, and manufacturer petitioned for 
certification. The Supreme Court, Han 
dler, J., held that evidence created ques-
tions for jury as to whether die-casting 
machine was defective as originally de-
signed and while under control of manufac 
turer, whether alteration made by opera-
tor's employer to die-casting machine was 
"substantial" in terms of increasing risk of 
accidental injur}*, whether original design, 
despite alteration, contributed to occur-
rence of accident, and whether proximate 
cause of accident inhered either solely or 
concurrently and contributorily in defective 
design of machine. 
Appellate Division, affirmed. 
Clifford, Schreiber and Garibaldi, J J , 
concurred in result. 
Under strict products liability, manu-
facturer has duty to make sure that its 
manufactured products placed into stream,. 
of commerce are suitably safe when used 
for their intended or reasonably foreseea-
ble purposes; defective design of manufac-
tured pro met may constitute basis for 
c-^cr iin „-.'!_s liability in tort 
VJ. 1984) 
. Product- Ljal>ili!i O i l , 15 
Requisite elements of cause of action 
based on strict liability for design defects 
comprise proof that product design was 
defective, that defect existed when prodm ict 
:
 as under control of and distributed, bj 
defendant, and that defect caused, injury to 
reasonably foreseeable user. 
3. Products Liability O i l 
Ordinarily, standard for determining 
whether manufactured product has been 
designed defectively involves "risk-utility " 
theory, which encompasses factors relevant 
to both usefulness and safety of particular 
product, based on thesis that only product 
w hose utility outweighs its inherent risk, 
provided that risk has been reduced to 
gi -rort extent possible consistent with, 
pi . . . -L .S continued utility, should be mar-
keted. 
4 Products Liability 09G 
In die-casting machine operators strict 
liability action against manufacturer, evi-
dence that machine as originally designed 
without safety gauge and interlock device 
ecuiId start up accidentally when person's 
1 iai ids were in contact with movable parts 
of machine and that such safety devices 
were available and could have been incorpo-
rated into machine without detracting from 
its usefulness or adding unduly to its cost 
created question for jury as to whether 
die casting machine was defective as origi-
nally designed and. while i inder control of 
manufacturer 
5, P r o d u c t. s I .* i a b i I i t y €=75 
To establish strict products liability, it 
must be shown that defect in product proxi-
mately caused accident and resulting inju-
ries to foreseeable user while product was 
being used for its intended or anticipated 
purposes 
rouuets Liability C=»1G 
Altnough product must reach its user 
•.*,Jjout substantial change in condition in 
which i: is sold to subject manufacturer or 
-ibutor to strict liability, subsequent al-
u •><" of manufacti ired product will not 
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serve to provide defense to manufacturer if 
that subsequent alteration is not substan-
tial in terms of essential features of prod-
uct. 
7. Products Liability C=>16 
Although change in product may be 
material or significant from design or oper-
ational standpoint for purpose of imposing 
strict liability on manufacturer or distribu-
tor of product, change is not "substantial" 
unless it is related to safety of product; 
"substantial alteration" involves not only 
material change in design or function of 
product but also affects risk of danger in 
its use. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
8. Products Liability <S=>90 
In die-casting machine operator's ac-
tion against manufacturer, evidence that 
machine was originally designed to operate 
manually, so that each cycle could be start-
ed only by use of specific button and each 
cycle came to definite stop before succeed-
ing cycle could be started, and that opera-
tor's employer altered machine so that cy-
cles occurred continuously without inter-
ruption, created question for jury as to 
whether die-casting machine, for strict lia-
bility purposes, was substantially altered 
after it left manufacturer's control. 
9. Products Liability c=>16 
Manufacturer of product may be held 
strictly liable for injuries proximately 
caused by design defect in that product 
even if product underwent substantial 
change after leaving manufacturer's con-
trol, if original design defect constituted 
either sole or concurrent or contributing 
proximate cause of accident. 
10. Products Liability C=>9() 
In die-casting machine operator's strict 
liability action against manufacturer for in-
juries which resulted when operator's hand 
was caught in machine while it was mov-
ing, evidence created question whether 
original design of machine, in lacking safe-
ty gate and interlock, contributed either 
solely and independently or concurrently 
and contributorily to occurrence of acci-
dent, whether or not operator's employer's 
alterations, which caused machine to oper-
ate automatically, were "substantial." 
11. Products Liability c=>16 
When it is foreseeable that substantial 
change to product after it is sold will create 
risk of injury, manufacturer can be held 
liable under strict liability principles for 
injuries proximately caused by such 
change; in event of either substantial alter-
ation or misuse, manufacturer will be re-
sponsible for resulting injuries to operator 
if alteration or misuse implicated in actual 
use of machine was foreseeable and could 
have been prevented or reduced by manu-
facturer, and mere fact that machine was 
Substantially altered will not exonerate or 
absolve manufacturer from responsibility 
for design defect which foreseeably con-
tributed to ultimate accident. 
12. Products Liability <®=>90 
In die-casting machine operator's strict 
liability action against manufacturer for in-
juries suffered while he was operating ma-
chine, in which only testimony regarding 
lack of warnings of product danger consist-
ed of absence thereof at time of accident, 
evidence did not create question as to man-
ufacturer's liability for failure to warn, but 
on remand, if relevant evidence on issue 
was admitted, jury might appropriately 
consider question. 
13. Products Liability C=90 
Given manufacturer's legal duty to 
manufacture machine which is suitabJy 
safe for its intended or anticipated pur-
poses by foreseeable users under risk-utili-
ty standard, question of fact is created for 
jury as to whether that duty was breached. 
George J. Kenny, Newark, for defend-
ant-appellant (Connell, Foley & Geiser, 
Newark, attorneys). 
Allen B. Gillman, Metuchen, for plaintiff-
respondent. 
Vlir npiiiinii it rhr I mi 
SOLER v. CASTMASTER, DIV OF H.P.M. CORP N I ] 22 3 
Cite as 484 A,.2d 1225 (N..J 1984) 
rt " * as delivered fendant had in it tl ic eiei nents which v, ei e 
the proximate cause of this accident" 
The Appellate Division reversed and re-
manded the matter for trial. The court 
ruled that there were unresolved factual 
disputes relating to whether (1) the ma-
chine was defective when manufactured; 
(2) the employer's alterations created an 
entirely different functional machine; and 
(3) the design defect proximately caused 
the accident. The Appellate Division also 
ruled that the "proffered testimony consti-
tuted sufficient basis for at least a consid-
eration of the inadequate warning, design 
defect question " This Court granted certi-
fication, 93 N.J. 272, 460 A 2d 674 (1983). 
For the reasons expressed in this opinion, 
we affirm the judgment of the Appellate 
Division 
j .;DLER J. 
I | .is appeal, as well as the companion 
case of Brown v. United States Stove Co,t 
98 N.J. 155, 484 A 2d 1234 (1984), decided 
today, presents as a major issue a manu-
facturer's responsibility under principles of 
strict products liability for injuries to a 
foreseeable user of a machine that was 
substantially altered after it left the manu-
facturer's control. We must address a se-
ries of questions in resolving the ultimate 
issue: whether the machine as originally 
designed was defective; whether the sub-
sequent alteration was substantial; wheth-
er the alteration was foreseeable; and 
whether the original design defect was a 
proximate cause of the accident, taking into 
account the subsequent alteration. Be-
cause of the procedural course by which 
this case reaches us, we must also consider 
the standards for deciding when any of 
these issues presents a question for a 
jury's determination and when it is proper-
ly left for the court to decide. 
Plaintiff, Manuel Soler, sued defei idant 
Castmaster, Division of H.P.M. Corp., for 
the improper manufacture of a die-casting 
machine, the operation of which caused him 
severe injuries. The complaint alleged 
causes of action in strict liability, as well as 
negligence and intentional wrongdoing, for 
the accidental injuries. Although other 
parties were named originally as defend-
ants, they are no longer in the case. The 
matter was tried before a jury. After most 
of plaintiffs evidence had been presented, 
the trial court, on defendant's motion, en-
tered a judgment of involuntary dismissal 
against plaintiff pursuant to Rule 4:37. In 
entering that judgment, the trial court 
ruled that there was no dispute that the 
machine had been altered by the plaintiff's 
employer, and, as altered, was "an entirely 
different functional machine." Further, 
according to the court, there was "no evi-
dence from which a jury could find that the 
machine as designed and sold b> the de 
I 
Plaintiff was injured A 1 len certain mo\ -
ing parts of a die-casting machine, manu-
factured by defendant, closed on his hand. 
The machine included a mold consisting of 
two parts, one of which was stationary. In 
the operation of the machine, during one 
cycle, the two parts of the mold closed 
together, forming a cavity into which mol-
ten metal was injected. During a second 
cycle, the metal cooled and the two parts of 
the mold would separate, freeing the cast 
metal from the mold. According to the 
original design of the manufacturer, each 
cycle of the machine was started manually 
by the operator. The first cycle began 
when the operator pressed a designated 
electrical push-buttont causing the mold to 
close so that hot metal could be injected 
into it. The second cycle started when the 
operator pressed another button, permit-
ting the metal to cool and the completed 
cast to drop from the mold or be removed 
by hand by the operator. Further,, as de-
signed and manufactured by defendant,. 
there was no safety pate or anv other 
device to guard against a person's hand, or 
fingers from coming into contact wj^ h the. 
machine's movinir parts while it was either 
ii i. motion or callable of being set in motion 
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The machine also lacked an interlock to cut 
off power while a worker's hands were 
engaged in dislodging a jammed part from 
inside the machine. 
Sometime after the machine left the man-
ufacturer's control, plaintiffs fcmnj,oy»'r al-
tered the manual mode for.startme each 
cvcle. It added a trip wire that automati-
cally started all cycles after the machine 
was initially turned on. As altered, the 
second cycle was completed when the cast 
product separated and fell from the mold, 
striking the trip wire, which would auto-
matically activate the first cycle. Thus, as 
altered, the cycles operated continuously. 
At the time the trip wire was incorporated 
into the machine, the employer also added a 
safety gate. When this gate was opened, it 
would shut off all power into the machine, 
preventing the opening or closing of the 
mold. 
Plaintiff testified that the injury oc-
curred when he attemuted to dislodge a 
finished .product fhpr ^*A rat f.illan iVno 
from the moid. Apparently, tnis type of 
jamming of tne machine was frequent. In 
attempting to dislodge the piece, plaintiff 
claimed that he opened the safety gate and 
reached into the machine. At this point, 
the machine was stopped. However, after 
plaintiff dislodged the part, the machine 
started up, catching his hand between the 
two parts of the mold. Although plaintiff 
testified that the safety gate was open 
when the machine began to move, his su-
pervisor, who arrived moments after the 
accident, testified that plaintiffs arm was 
somehow under the closed safety gate. At 
trial, plaintiff did not offer an explanation 
as to how the machine recycled when he 
attempted to dislodge the part. However, 
in deposition he had testified that when the 
piece fell from, the mold, it had hit the trip 
wire, reactivating the cycle. 
It was undisputed that the automatic 
starting mechanism and safety gate were 
added to the machine by plaintiffs employ-
er. However, plaintiffs export testifier* 
that the macnine was unsal'e_a^di^wiad-
oecause it naa no safety crate or device to 
?"*• as a barrier in preventing a jiers-mV 
nancs from ccntacto^-£h£ machine's rnrv-
inrj&cls. The expert further testified that 
the machine should have been equipped 
with a safety interlock that would shut off 
all electrical power to the machine. In his 
opinion, the lack of this device was crucial, 
since it was foreseeable that a machine—ei-
ther manual or automatic—could malfunc-
tion while a person's hi.nd was inside the 
machine. 
Even as originally designed, when a cycle 
was stopped in the manual mode and the 
operator was required to press a button to 
start the machine, the danger or risk that 
the machine would start up accidentally 
was still present. Plaintiffs expert analo-
gized the situation to that of a light switch 
in the "off" position, subject to the existing 
danger that a large surge of electricity 
would override the switch and cause the 
machine to start. A. safety gate with an 
interlock would have eliminated this risk. 
Those safety devices, according to the ex-
pert, were available at the time the ma-
chine was built. In addition, the expert 
testified that such devices would have en-
tailed only moderate cost and would not 
have impaired the usefulness of the ma-
chine. He aKn sts»t.cd that tb#* safetv de-
vice later furnished bv the employer was 
inadequate, as evidenced by the agcirient 
itself. 
The expert further testified that al-
though the machine was altered in some 
respects, "the original machine was still 
there." Plaintiff argues that this state-
ment corroborates testimony of plaintiffs 
supervisor that the machine's function re-
mained unchanged by the alterations. In 
addition, the evidence relating to the design 
and alteration of the machine included tes-
timony that the machine did not have any 
danger warnings on it at the time of the 
accident. There was, however, no testimo-
ny as to the presence or lack of any warn-
ings pertaining to the dangers in operating 
the machine at the time the machine left 
the control of the manufacturer. 
II 
[1,2] Under' strict products liability a 
manufacturer has a duty to make sure that 
its manufactured products placed into the 
stream of commerce are suitably safe when 
used for their intended or reasonably fore-
seeable purposes. Suter v. San Angela 
Foundry & Mack. Co., 81 NJ 150, 169, 
406 AM 140 (1979); see Green v. Sterling 
Extruder Corp., 95 NJ. 263, 264, 471 AM 
15 (1984), A defect in the design of a 
manufactured product may constitute a ba-
sis for strict products liability in tort. E.g., 
Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Coiy,f 
91 NJ. 386f 394., 451 A2d 179 (1982). In 
defining a manufacturer's duty and identi-
fying the factors that constitute its breach, 
we have developed a basic formulation of 
the strict products liability doctrine as re-
lated to defects in design. The requisite 
elements of a cause of action based on 
strict liability for design defects comprise 
proof that (1) the product design was defec-
tive; (2) the defect existed when the prod-
uct was under the control of and distribut-
ed by defendant; and (3) the defect caused 
injury to a reasonably foreseeable user. 
O'Brien v. Musfcin Corp., 94 NJ. 169, 179, 
463 AM 298 (1983), (citing Michalko, su-
pra, 91 NJ at 394, 451 A2d 179); see In 
re Cadillac V8-6-4 Class Action, 93 NJ. 
412,. 426, 461 AM 736 (1983). 
[31 We have recognized in this context 
that the term "defect" is not self-defining 
and has no universally accepted meaning' 
suitable for all strict products liability 
cases. O'Brien, supra, 94 NJ. at 180, 463 
A.2d 298. Ordinarily, the standard for de-
termining whether a manufactured product 
has been designed defectively involves the 
risk-utility theory. Id., 94 NJ. at 181, 463 
AM 298, Central to the strict products 
liability doctrine is the thesis that "only 
safe products should be marketed—a safe 
product being one whose utility outweighs 
its inherent risk, provided that risk has 
been reduced to the greatest extent possi-
ble consistent with the product's con tinned. 
utiiity." Freund v. Cellofihu Properties, 
hie, 87 NJ. 229, 238 n . ' l , 432 AM 925 
22S (NJ ISM 
(1.981), The risk-utility standard encom-
passes factors relevant to both the useful-
ness and the safety of the particular prod-
uct. Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g. Co., 
Inc., 76 NJ. 152, 174, 386 AM 816"(1978); 
see O'Brien, supraf 94 NJ at 1.82-84, 463 
A 2d. 298; Suicrf supra, 81 NJ. at 177, 4.06 
A 2d 140. 
"The initial inquiry in, this appeal there-
fore must focus on the evidence bearing on 
whether the die-casting machine was defec-
tive when priginally designed, manufac-
ttired, and under the control of the manu-
facturer in terms of the relevant factors 
encompassed by the risk-utility standard. 
Did the manufacturer act as a reason-
ably prudent person by designing • -
item, as He did and by placu^ a ^ 
market in, that condition, or should he 
have designed it, to incorporate certain 
safety features or some other modifica-
tions? Depending upon the proofs, some 
factors which may be considered by the 
jury in deciding the reasonableness of 
the manufacturer's conduct include the 
technological feasibility of manufactur-
ing a product whose design would have 
prevented or avoided the accident, given 
the known slate of the art; and the likeli-
1 i,ood. that the product will cause injury 
and the probable seriousness of the inju-
ry. See Cepeda, supra, 76 A7J. at 
1,74 [386 AM 816],. [Suter, supra, 81 
NJ. at 171,-72, 406 A.2d 140.] 
As noted, plaintiffs expert testified that 
the machine should have been designed to 
incorporate a safety interlock so that the 
machine could shut off ail electric power> 
thereby rendering it inoperative while a 
worker had his or her hands inside the 
machine. He expressed the opinion that 
the machine as originally designed without 
a safety gate and interlock device was de-
fective because it could, malfunction, that 
is, start up accidently, when a person's 
hands were in contact with movable parts 
of the machine. Safety devices of this 
character would have prevented trie inad-
vertent or unintended start up of the ma-
chine and would, have protected, a worker 
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from placing his or her hands in contact 
with the moving parts of the machine. He 
further testified that such safety devices 
were available and that they could have 
been incorporated into the machine without 
detracting from its usefulness or adding 
unduly to its cost. 
This evidence was sufficient under the 
risk-utility axis to demonstrate that, as de-
signed, the risk of danger inherent in the 
machine outweighed its usefulness. The 
evidence disclosed a demonstrable risk of 
harm to a foreseeble user of the machine in 
the absence of a safety gate and interlock. 
Further, the evidence revealed that the 
technology for incorporating these safety 
devices was known to the industry at the 
time the machine was manufactured an/f 
that such devices were available and coyiid 
have been incorporated into the machine 
without appreciable cost and without im-
pairing its function. 
[4] In light of this evidence, considered 
within the framework of the risk-utility 
standard, we are satisfied that the proofs 
were adequate to enable the jury to deter-
mine that the die-casting machine was de-
fective as orirnnallv £es»gn£d and while 
under the control of the manulacturer. 
Ill 
[5] To establish strict products liability 
it must be shown that the defect in the 
product proximately caused the accident 
and resulting injuries to a foreseeable user 
while the product was being used for its 
intended or anticipated purposes. Michal-
ko, supra, 91 NJ. at 394, 451 A 2d 17!); 
Suter, supra. 81 NJ. at 176, 406 .4.2d 140. 
In this case, the trial court ruled that the 
manufacturer was not liable because the 
die-casting machine had been substantially 
altered after it left the manufacturer's con-
trol. The Appellate Division, however, re-
versed and remanded, ruling that factual 
disputes existed as to the extent of the 
alteration and its causal relation to the 
accident. The defendant argues before us 
that the Appellate Division erred in revers-
ing the trial court. It asserts that a prod-
ucts liability case against a manufacturer 
involving a product that has been substan-
tially altered should be dismissed as a mat-
ter of law, if the "alteration so changes the 
operation of the machine that an accident, 
which could not have occurred as the ma-
chine was designed, is caused to occur by 
the very nature of the subsequent 
changes/' 
IG] Under the strict liability doctrine, a 
product must reach its user "without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it 
is sold." PoUfttTment (Second) of^Torte 
§ AQ9\ifflh) (1965). However, a subse-
ou>?fft alteration of a manufactured product 
will not serve to provide a defense to the 
manufacturer if that subsequent alteration 
is not substantial in terms of the essential 
features of the product. See Whitehead v. 
St Joe Lead Co., Inc., 729 F.2d 238, 250 
(3d Gir.1984) (fact that defendants supplied 
contaminating lead in the form of ingots as 
opposed to airborne particles or metal fines 
dSfcmeii inconsequential); State* S.S^C&n^ 
Stone Manganese Marine, Ltd., 371 
F.Supp. 500, 505 (D.N.J.1973) (change of 
shape not dispositive of "substantial 
change"); Union Supply Co. v. Punt, 196 
Colo. 162, 583 7J.2d 276, 233 (1978) (en 
bane ) (small changes and minor processing 
do not constitute substantial change). 
17J Further, while a change in a prod-
uct may be material or significant from a 
design or operational standpoint, it is not 
"substantial" for strict liability purposes 
unless it is related to the safety of the 
product. "Substantia! change" has been 
characterized as "deal[ing] principally with 
material changes in the state of the prod-
uct" linked to the accident as opposed to 
"[cjhanges to other features [that] had no 
material effect upon [the machine's] poten-
tial for danger." Ortiz v. Far ret I Co., 171 
NJ.Supcr. 109, 117, 407 A.2d 1290 (Law 
Div.1979); Restatement, supra, § 402A 
comment 10. A substantial alteration is 
one that involves not only a material 
change in the design or function of the 
product but also affects the risk of danger 
SOI ER i. CAS rMAS I EI t 
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ll! its use. See Hanlon v. Cyril Bath Co., 
541 F.2d 343, 345 (3d Cir.1975) (substitution 
of electrical starting device in press brake 
machine that was mobile and easily activat 
ed in place of original foot treadle suspend-
ed above the floor and requiring considera 
ble pressure to activate constituted sub 
stantial change). 
[8] The evidence in this case fair'lv 
posed a jury Question 25JLa wh^tVr th^ 
change made by plaintiff's erp.t>hv£r to the 
*aie-castmg~ machine was " substantial" in 
terms of increasing its risk of accidental 
miurv. We have noted that as designed, 
the machine was operated manually; it 
functioned in two successive but disconti-
nuous cycles. Each cycle could be started 
only by the use of a specific button and 
each cycle came to a definite stop before 
the succeeding cycle could be started. As 
altered, the machine operated automatical 
ly rather than manually, the cycles occur-
ring continuously without interruption. 
The operational risk of danger in using the 
machine as originally designed with manual/ 
buttons to start each cycle was qualitative-
ly and materially different from the ris'kjs 
of danger in the automatic operation of the 
machine in its altered state. Consequently, 
the evidence in the case was ample to per-
mit a jury to conclude that the die-casting 
machine, for strict liability purposes, had-
been substantially altered after it left the 
control of the defendant 
The critical question then is wl icthei t1 ,p. 
original defect in the design of the ma-_ 
chine—the absence of a safety jrate with 
interlock—constitutes a proximate caus«Q of 
the accjuem, notwithstanding _ the sub*p 
quent substantial alteration. We said in 
'Michalko supra, 9] V., J. at 400, 451 AM 
179: 
Even a significant subsequent alteratioi i 
of a manufactured product will not re-
lieve the manufacturer of liability unless . 
the change itself creates the defect that 
constitutes the proximate cause of the 
injury. States Steamship, 371 F.Supp. 
at 505. Thus, if the defect which, singly 
or in combination, caused the injury ex 
i: I • OF I I I M CC Rl: . j . , 1 
2,25 {! 1 1 1984) 
isted before, as well as after, the change, 
the manufacturer is not relieved of liabil-
ity, regardless of how much the product 
has been changed. Id.; Ortiz v. Farrell 
Co., 171 NJ.Supcr. 109 [407 4 2d 1290] 
(Law Div.1979). 
This understanding' of proximate cause 
was foreshadowed in Finnegan v. Havir 
Mfg. Corp., GO N.J. 413, 290 A 2d 2S6 
(1972). In that case, plaintiff was injured 
by a power punch press he was operating 
for his employer. This Court reversed a 
judgment n,o,v, in fa\ or of the manufactur-
er. Implicit in our decision was the pre-
mise that the original design defect in the 
die machine—the absence of a safety de-
vice —could constitute a proximate cause of 
the accident, regardless of whether the 
subsequent alteration—consisting of a 
change in the starting mechanism of the 
machine—was deemed substantial by the 
jurv 
[9] The rule that emerges is that tfcfc 
manufacturer of a product may be held 
strictly liable for injuries proximately 
caused by a design defect in that product 
e\ en if the product did undergo substantial 
cl ia,nge after leaving the manufacturer's 
control, if the original design defect consti-
tuted either the sole or a concurrent or 
contributing proximate cause of the acci-
dent. See Michalko, supra., 91 NJ. at 400, 
M51 .4.2d 179 
[10] frr fckis- s«w^ -a* vrc have said, the 
jury could on the evidence presented deter-
mine 'T17!n, TTie machine had neer subjected 
to a substantial alteration atter lea vine the 
contrui ot ueienuant. Still, the jury could 
reach tne iurtner conclusion that the origi-
nal design, though substantially changed, 
did contribute to the occurrence of the acci-
dent, and that the proximate cause of the 
accident inhered solely or primarily in the 
original defective design of the machine. 
As we observed in Finnegan: 
1
 The jury could infer that because of tl le 
lack of a safety device the accident 
would have occurred notwithstanding the 
change to an electrical foot pedal. Thi is, 
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it could conclude that the substitution 
had little or nothing to do with the hap-
pening of the accident. At the most the 
alteration bears on the issue of proxi-
mate cause and was a matter for the 
jury. [60 NJ. at 423-24, 25)0 .4.2(1 2Sf>.) 
The iury could also determine that the 
substantial chaui£".CDiU«h"reri r o T h e hPn-
pening of the accident in conjunction with 
the machine's original desijrn riefert—rihe 
absence ot a saietv gate and interlock In 
tnat event defendant could still be liable 
because the original defect, although not 
the sole cause of the accident, would consti-
tute a contributing or concurrent proximate 
cause in conjunction with the subsequent 
alteration. Michalko, supra, 91 NJ. at 
400, 451 A. 2d 179; see Frcuvd, supra. S7 
NJ. at 247-48, 432 A 2d 92.'; see also 
Sheldon v. West Bend Equip. Corp., 718 
F.2d 603, 608 (3d Cir.1983) (under Pennsyl-
vania law, substantial change to products is 
properly relevant to manufacturer's de-
fense in product liability action only if ab-
sent the change, injury would not have 
occurred); Southwire Co. v. Bcloit E. 
Corp., 370 F.Supp. 842, 857 n. 21 (E.D.Pa. 
1974) (for substantial change to negate [Re-
statement ] § 402A liability, it must be in-
tervening superseding cause or perhaps 
even sole proximate cause of injury); Un-
ion Supply Co. v. Pust, supra, 583 P.2d at 
283 ("[E]ven substantial changes which do 
not affect a pre-existing design defect in 
parts do not absolve the manufacturer of 
liability."). 
Defendant here argues from the evi-
dence that the accidental injury occurred 
when the completed molded piece struck 
the trip wire, which was part of the auto-
matic system installed by the employer, 
reactivating the machine and causing the 
mold to close on plaintiffs hand. Conse-
quently, according to defendant, the trip 
wire alteration could be found by a fact-
finder to be the sole proximate cause of the 
accident, independent of the alleged design 
defect—the absence of a safety gale and 
interlock. The trial court's ruling in this 
case to the effect that the original design 
defect had in it no "elements which were 
the proximate cause of this accident," ante 
at 1227, apparently accepted this position. 
[ I l l The defendant's argument that in 
this case third persons responsible for the 
subsequent alteration of the machine 
should properly be held liable for plaintiffs 
accidental injury does not fully take into 
account the appropriate applications of the 
principle of foreseeability. When it is fore-
seeable that a substantial change will cre-
ate a risk of injury, the manufacturer can 
be held liable under strict liability princi-
ples for injuries proximately caused by 
such change. In Cepeda, supra, we said 
that "in applying strict liability in torts for 
design defects, manufacturers cannot es-
cape liability on grounds of misuse or ab-
normal use if the actual use proximate to 
the injury was objectively foreseeable." 76 
NJ. at 177, 386 A2d 816 (citations omit-
ted). Foreseeable misuse or abnormal use 
can be extended by analogy to foreseeable 
substantial change of the product from its 
original design. We recognized this ex-
pressly in Brown v. United States Stove 
Co., supra, 98 NJ. at 169-170, 484 A.2d 
1241-1242. See Whitehead v. St. Joe Lead 
Co., Inc.. supra. 729 F.2d at 250. Thus, in 
the event of either a substantial alteration 
or misuse, the manufacturer will be respon-
sible for resultant injuries to an operator if 
the alteration or misuse implicated in the ac-
tual use of the machine was foreseeable and 
could have been prevented or reduced by 
the manufacturer. Id.; sec also Saupitty 
v. Yazoo Mfg. Co., Inc., 726 F.2d 657, 659 
(10th Cir.1984) (under Oklahoma law when 
foreseeable subsequent modification of 
product causes plaintiffs injury, manufac-
t u r e is liable under § 402AV Merriweatircr* 
". E.W. Bliss Co., (536 F.2d 42, 45, 46 (3d 
Cir.1980) ("[B]y its very terms, [Restate-
ment] § 402A seems to indicate that only 
unexpected substantial changes will ab-
solve the seller of a product from liability 
for injuries caused by that product."; * 
[T]he manufacturer * * * should be held 
responsible for all dangers which result 
SOLER v. CASTMASTER, DIV. Of" ilVM f HRP " I | ' ) , { , { 
Cite as 484 A.2d 1225 (NJ. 1984) 
modifications of that duty to warn may be found "without re-''•"•m iVr ?seeaok; 
product. ';; Thompson v. Package Mich 
Co., 22 CalApp.U 188, 196, 99 'CoLIivh-
281, 286 (Ct.App.1072) (manufacture.- mnv 
be held liable where alteration of mac:iin*.' 
or its misuse by customer was reasonable 
foreseeable); Duke v. Gulf c£ Wcswrn 
Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d 404, 414 (Mo.Ct.App. 
1983) (although substantial changes in 
product may in some circumstances relieve 
manufacturer of liability, that is not so if 
changes were foreseeable and did not un-
foreseeable* render product unsafe). Con-
sequently, the mere fact that the machine 
was substantially altered will not exonerate 
or absolve the manufacturer from responsi-
^'
I :MT
 for a design defect that foreseeably 
jjlarited tn the ultimate accident. 
• <um, the evidence presented in the 
case fairly raised a jury question as to 
whether the original design defect in the 
die-casting machine constituted either the 
sole, independent cause of the accident or a 
concurrent or contributing proximate 
cause. This evidence, together with that 
relating to the existence of a design defect 
in the machine while still under the control 
of defendant, was sufficient to establish a 
prima facie cause of action in strict prod-
ucts liability, warranting the jury's con- - ' 
•eratioR. 
IV 
Plaintiff also raised an inadequate aic'v 
u
 ng ciaur. in this case. We observed -n 
..Tro, sf*prat 91 NJ. at 402-03. 451 I 
-d 179, that affixing suitable warnings -T 
giving specific cautionary instructions for 
the benefit of foreseeable users of the :n-
n
.?r-'^ r dan;:-r- .r, ; M I ^ -L machine without 
<i ociiety o* .-*> mignt reduce the risk • f 
injury S^ bcxiga x\ Havir Mfg. Co < ; 
;02t ; : . 290 .4.2d 2S1 (1.972), v 
The Appellate Division ruled that 
•*- a:m based on failure to warn should 
•>e considered on remand. Plaintiffs claim 
on this theory was properly dismissed be-
cause the only testimony regarding a lack 
of warnings consisted of the absence there-
of at the time of the accident. While the 
gard to prevailing industry standards," Mi-
rmJko. supra, 91 NJ. at 402. 451 .4,2(1 179 
ioting Frcund, supra, 87 NJ. at 242-43, 
4;^ 2 .4 2d 925), no evidence about such 
•* :rnmgs at the time the machine left de-
:< .-cant's control was offered. Sec Lynch 
v, Gatlcr Sevcv-Up Prc-Mix Corp., 74 NJ. 
146, 152, 37G A,2d 1211 (1977); Scanlon v. 
General Motors Corp., 65 NJ. 582, 591, 
326 A.2d 673 (1974),,, Nevertheless, since 
the case must be retried, if relevant evi-
dence on this issue is admitted, the ques-
tion may be appropriately considered by 
the jury. 
V 
By way of conclusion, w e add expressly 
that which is clearly implicit in our analysis 
and determination, namely, that each of the 
issues addressed m our opinion, upon a 
sufficient "evidential showing- on r^tm' is 
proper iv To He considered p jury ojiestion 
rather man a matter of Jaw^nJ^p <W^PH 
solely Bv* **p court The distinction we 
have drawn in this regard in differentiating 
between matters that present questions of 
law and questions of fact rests basically 
upon the distinction we recognize between 
'he determination of a duty and the deter-
•
 |v:.tt:o«i of a breach of duty. 
" *: As a threshold step, "[i]t is for the 
>• . . to determine whether a legal duty 
^\\- ne imposed." Michalko, supra, 91 
V./. at 398, 451 .4.2d 179. In this case, the 
•ecognition and imposition of such a duty 
founded in strict liability principles are 
clearly settled as a matter of law. See 
Snter, supra, 81 NJ. at 172, 406 A 2d 140. 
That duty is to manufacture a machine that 
is suitably safe for its intended or anticipa-
te; . urnoses by foreseeable users under 
the risk-utility standard. Id. On the other 
nand, given the duty, it is the jury that 
must then determine whether that duty has 
been breached. In making this determina-
tion the jury in effect resolves the issues so 
as to achieve the "just result between the 
parties." Id., 81 A7. J. at 173, 406 -4.2d 140. 
All of the cyi£jilia»* 44*H4 ham.* heeu-djs-
cussed in the course of this decision—origi-
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nal design defect, subsequent substantial 
alteration, and proximate causation—are 
nroperly to be considered iurv questions 
ITone as such calls lor me creation, recog-
nition and imposition of a basic duty as a 
matter of public policy Further, the e\i-
dence relating to each is not indisputable or 
so clearly preponderate in terms of ulti-
mate factual conclusions as to present a 
matter of law to be determined by the 
court. As we noted in Finncgan, supia, 
60 AV. at 423, 290 A 2d 2S6, "it was for the 
jury to determine whether the substitution 
* * * was such a 'substantial change' with-
in the meaning of the Restatemtnt as 
would relieve Havir of liability" See 
O'Brien, supra, 94 AV at 186, 463 A 2d 
298 (these kinds of questions may be re-
solved by judge or jury, depending on the 
adequacy of proofs); see also Thompson v. 
Package Mach. Co., supra, 22 Cat App 3d 
at 196, 99 Cat Rptr at 286 (manufacturer 
may be held liable where alteration of ma-
chine or its misuse by customers was rea-
sonably foreseeable, which is jury question, 
as is whether or not machine was designed 
with reasonable care to protect persons 
using product m way it was intended to be 
used against foreseeable danger), Mcru-
weatherv E.W. Bliss Co, supra, 636 F2d 
at 45 ("[Determination is for the fact-find-
er unless the inferences are so clear that a 
court can say as a matter of law that a 
reasonable manufacturer could not have 
foreseen the change.") (quoting DAvtona 
v. Hampton Grinding Wheel Co, 225 Pa 
Super. 120, 125, 310 A 2d 307, 310 tt*»)) 
For the reasons presented, the Court af-
firms the Appellate Division's judgment 
that the trial court erred in entering judg-
ment for defendant as a matter of ljuv and 
that Ehr «*e£U£ ba cenwu^rti ior trial 
CLIFFORD, SCHREIBER and GARI-
BALDI, JJ , concurring in the result 
For affirmance—Chief Justice WIL-
ENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD, 
SCHREIBER, HANDLER, POLLOCK, 
O'HERN and GARIBALDI—7 
For reversal —None. 
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Employee who was injured when free-
standing space heater situated m emplov 
er's garage flared-up brought products lia-
bility action against the heater manufactur-
er The Superior Court, Law Division dis-
missed. The Superior Court, Appellate Di-
vision reversed and remanded. Certifica-
tion was granted The Supreme Court, 
Handler, J , held that: (1) a manufacturer 
can be held liable for design defects if it is 
objective by foreseeable that a substantial 
change in the product will cause injury; (2) 
condition of the product, rather than con-
duct of the manufacturer, is determinative 
of ultimate responsibility for product fail-
uie causing accidental injuries; (3) public 
policy and fairness concerns are relevant 
evidence bearing on causation determina-
tion, (4) there was sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate objective foreseeability of re-
moval of heater's safety control mechanism 
and misuse of the product; (5) evidence or 
whether heater was defectively designed 
was for jury; and (6) subsequent miscon-
duct of employer in removing safety con-
trols was an mcependent cause of the acci-
dent and any shortcomings in design were 
only remotely CDnnected with the eventual 
accident. 
Judgment of Appellate Division re-
versed. 
Schreiber, J filed concurring opinion 
in which Clifford and Garibaldi, JJ , joined. 
1. Products Liability 'S=>10 
A manufacturer has a duty to insure 
that its manufactured products placed into 
